Community (Economic) Reintegration: Implementation Challenges
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants."2
Typically, there is resentment that DDR programs benefit perpetrators of violence, while ignoring the people that stayed behind. The same issue pertains to returnees, IDPs and their relationship to their communities. There is also an issue of mandates from the UN agencies the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) leads DDR efforts, while UNHCR deals with issues relating to returnees. Until recently, the agencies have not coordinated their efforts and still struggle to develop a more integrated approach. The problem is both institutional and ideological the needs of ex-combatants, returnees, and IDPs are different and as such, are handled by different international actors. Ideologically, there is now recognition that all of these groups are dependent on each other in creating and sustaining peace.
Traditionally, reintegration programs for ex-combatants have not meaningfully engaged the community and have not recognized linkages to displaced persons. As USAID highlights however, income-generating and capacity-building activities for ex-combatants alone will not promote their integration into civilian life; it will not help them gain acceptance in the communities in which they choose to live. In fact, "their exclusive access to training programs and apprenticeships might increase the resentment that other community members feel toward those who have disrupted, if not destroyed, their lives during the violent conflict. Therefore, targeting communities as a whole may lead to more durable reintegration of former combatants."3 These issues are also applicable to the reintegration of displaced persons into communities.
Recognition of this reality has prompted a holistic view of reintegration as a community issue. UNHCR, for example, is increasing its efforts to include ex-combatants in its work. Recognizing that ex-combatants frequently have family members that are displaced, UNHCR, in conjunction with other actors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF, has begun to support family reunification programs, as well as the involvement of demobilized combatants in community-based reintegration programs.4 Similarly, UNDP has expanded their efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants towards a more community-focused approach, such as community-wide programs on armed violence reduction and weapons management.5 Another example of this push for community-based reintegration strategies is USAID's Community Focused Reintegration (CFR) program. CFR aims "not only to reintegrate former combatants. They also [seek] to address a range of community needs, including, among others, the need for stronger local conflict resolution mechanisms, skills for generating non-farm income, and small-scale infrastructure improvements."6
Despite this clear need for integrated, community-based strategies, there are challenges. USAID notes that the most challenging aspect of community-based reintegration is the achievement of strong coordination between DDR actors and refugee and IDP actors. "Official DDR plans are often centrally funded, designed and directed. Any number of factors, including security and changes in concentrations of ex-combatants, can affect actual implementation."7 In order for peacebuilding actors to effectively implement holistic community-based reintegration strategies, the issue of coordination must be further analyzed and addressed in formulating policies.
[Back to Top] Relief to Development
Gaining mounting endorsement by scholars and practitioners is the notion that the transitions between emergency humanitarian relief, the subsequent process of reintegration and longer-term reconstruction, recovery and development do not occur in a seamless fashion. Addressing this relief to development gap, in a coordinated and collaborative manner, has thus become a priority for these agencies.8
In response to this ineffective, stratified response to relief and recovery, there has been a shift in recent years towards the conceptualization of the conflict to post-conflict transition as a continuum, whereby relief, recovery and development issues and responses are seen as overlapping and symbiotic processes. "Literature on the gap is underpinned by the notion of a continuum between relief and development which can be bridged by making relief aid more developmental and encouraging development agencies into areas of conflict at an earlier stage." This research is reinforced by field experience that points to the opportunity for development assistance to play a greater role integrating into peacebuilding processes.9
The implications of the conceptual and practical shift towards more comprehensive relief-development strategies for reintegration processes, however, remains unclear. International actors have worked from the assumption that displaced persons return to a stable political environment where the state has the capacity to manage the post-conflict environment.10 This assumption meant that UNHCR-managed return strategies and then handed over reintegration activities to development agencies for long-term planning with national governments.11 This line of thought fails to consider the reality that returnees and IDPs often do not return to areas where security has been fully established,12 where state institutions are already in place and where socio-political tensions have stabilized. As a result, distinctions between processes of return, reintegration and development are unclear. For this reason, both traditionally defined short-term relief strategies and long-term development objectives may be wholly appropriate for the transitional context. In other words, the environment no longer necessitates emergency relief assistance, such as food and shelter provision, but there are not sufficient institutions or capacities to fully support long-term, large-scale stabilization and growth programs. Presently, there is renewed focus on the gaps within this "early recovery" period amongst international actors.
The failure is thought to be a result of poor coordination and planning amongst reintegration and development actors, the different mandates and modalities of developmental and humanitarian agencies, and the lack of participation of communities themselves.13 Additionally, reintegration programs are believed to have failed in the past because they were not integrated into early national development planning.14
Sustainable reintegration strategies then are dependent on linking the agendas of development actors with the needs of returnees, IDPs, their communities, community-based organizations and local authorities, as well as wherever possible, be aligned with national priorities.15 There still remain however, identifiable challenges in melding relief and development activities for reintegration. Scholar Ian Smillie offers the following difficulties in linking relief and development:
- Timing: When to engage, when to modify the intervention, and when to withdraw;
- Funding: Emergency funding remains sporadic, arriving in short-term bursts and often after lengthy delays, and it is often overtly political. Similarly, development assistance too can be "patchy, cumbersome, and rigid, often arriving late and without reference to the emergency that it follows";
- Understanding: Getting information, especially at either end of the relief-development spectrum is vital; serious impediments to institutional learning continue to support the flourishing of inappropriate programs.16
Filling the "gap" and addressing this broad array of organizational and contextual challenges requires institutional change and coordination. This is not easy, as it demands that agencies expand their mandates and/or work in a more integrated manner.
As one agency at the forefront of these challenges for refugee and returnee reintegration, UNHCR is moving beyond simply meeting basic refugee survival needs and the monitoring and protection of returnees into longer-term peacebuilding and development strategies.17 And yet, it does not have the mandate or resources to sustain indefinitely its involvement in return and reintegration.18 Despite this limit to their mandate, UNHCR is involved with many activities that may fall into traditional development categories, such as road, schools and health center construction. The agency's reasoning is that "without [infrastructure and basic social services], many refugees and IDPs would not be able to go back to their own communities."19 With a broader interpretation of UNHCR's mandate, the agency is facing unresolved questions regarding their role in reintegration and peacebuilding and interactions with other institutions.20 According to UNHCR's "Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy", "The limits of UNHCRs engagement will be determined broadly by the needs that have to be addressed in areas of return as well as the presence (or absence) and implementation capacity of other actors."21
A fuller discussion of responses to the relief-development gap is undertaken in the economic recovery strategies section.
[Back to Top] 22 The World Bank has similarly emphasized the need to "avoid being lured into following a standard formula by remaining diligent in recognizing the uniqueness of each community and each conflict situation." Developing a thorough understanding of the local context can contribute, they argue, "to recognizing potential cultural and conflict pressure points, which are often particularly sensitive in a post-conflict environment."23 They suggest that project identification and selection, for example, should be "based on locally derived demands and take into consideration existing local capacities and limitations- community, government and infrastructure."24
According to UNHCR, the following factors shape the context and the resulting strategies of the reintegration process:
- The length of time and conditions of displacement;
- The nature of the conflict which resulted in displacement;
- The degree of destruction in the area of return;
- The capacity of national and local authorities;
- The presence or absence of humanitarian or development actors;
- The presence or absence of peacekeeping forces.25
In addition to the above factors, reintegration policies are also dependent on the provisions of the peace agreement, which should address the root causes of the conflict, and the repatriation process, which can either support or hinder reconciliation, reintegration and peacebuilding.26
Developing context-sensitive strategies for reintegration raises obvious challenges related to time and human and financial resource capacities and constraints: bringing a ready-made model is easier to implement, though this will likely undermine success and sustainability of efforts. Context sensitive concerns are similar to the notion of implementing a conflict-sensitive approach; while some equate these concepts, the latter however is explicitly concerned with factoring in considerations of the drivers of conflict within a particular context, into programming and policy-making.
[Back to Top] 27 Go to Empowerment
Recommendations for gender sensitive reintegration
- Support womens networks in areas of return;
- Support the sensitization of traditional leaders and men in areas of return;
- Encourage communities to establish support networks and counseling;
- Build the capacity of local government structures (and raise awareness among policy and law enforcement agencies) to promote and advocate for womens rights through interaction with the national government, the United nations and other partners;
- Ensure links with health care providers in areas of return and ensure that awareness and sensitivity to sexual and gender-based cases;
- Inform returnees how to access medical services;
- Extend community support programs to include men as target beneficiaries of opportunities aimed to empower community groups.
Source: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004), 1.24.
The related but stronger concept of gender mainstreaming is also considered vital in the UN's work with respect to reintegration, but also an increasing explicit priority for all international actors, and one that many governments are increasingly seeking to institutionalize nationally. Within the UN system, gender mainstreaming is defined as "a strategy for making women's as well as mens concerns and experiences an integral dimension of...the policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated."28 UNHCR has also developed an "Accountability Framework for Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming," which seeks to create organizational and operational norms and standards of practice for "achieving outcomes for all persons of concern: women, men, boys and girls of all backgrounds."29 Go to Employment and Empowerment
[Back to Top] capacity-building is needed for States "...to meet their international legal obligations to protect refugees" and that repatriation and reintegration activities "require a partnership framework involving host and donor governments, humanitarian assistance and developmental agencies, civil society, including NGOs, together with refugee themselves."30
States are not the only actors in need of capacity building; there is recognition of the need to involve the refugees and their communities in formulating capacity building programs and reintegration strategies. UNHCR, for example, in the Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, states that "capacity-building must extend beyond the government. Supporting the development of a vibrant civil society, including local human rights and humanitarian NGOs, community-based organizations and an independent media, is just as important...This will complement and reinforce efforts to enhance the protection capacity of the authorities."31 Interestingly, scholar Joanna Macrae asserts that "...Capacity-building remains an aspect of UNHCRs work in which the organization continues to be hesitant and somewhat ambivalent. As a consequence, UNHCR has never fully committed itself to defining, professionalizing and supporting such activities."32 Illustrating this point, ther are no stated mechanisms for building the capacities of communities and non-government institutions.
There is sometimes a fear thatthe international community assumes too prominent a role in determining reintegration and recovery strategies, at the risk of creating what Macrae calls "aid colonialism."33 At the same time, as Macrae highlights, "in accepting increasing responsibility for the management of conflict, not simply responding to its effects, the aid community treads a difficult line. On the one hand, it needs to demonstrate clearly its role to donors by emphasizing its ability to influence the internal causes of conflict. This requires being increasingly ambitious in its claims. On the other, the terms on which it does so are formulated in a way which is essentially apolitical and technocratic in order to avoid alienating both donor and recipient governments."34International actors also struggle with the decision to allow state governments to ultimately control the reintegration and recovery agenda when those "very authorities... may also threaten the human rights of returning refugees."35
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Incorporating reintegration strategies and the needs of returnees into national government priorities and policiesIntegrally connected to the previous challenge of national ownership of the process, ensuring that returnees and returnee areas are factored into local and area-based recovery programs, as well into national development plans and programs is a key challenge,36 or an objective not often met.
According to UNHCR, "...The needs of refugees and returnees have not systematically been incorporated in transition and recovery plans by governments concerned, the donor community and the UN system. Refugees and returnees are often not part of national recovery and development planning processes. Ignoring the needs of displaced populations in development planning and most importantly, their positive contribution to society may result in returnees becoming a possible source of instability to the country's rebuilding efforts."37 Go to Community Reintegration and Peacebuilding Processes
Returnees, or the remote regions they are repatriating to, may be low priorities for government, in contrast with other pressing issues viewed as more directly related to national security or development. Alternatively, "...Governments may at times push for a faster rate of return than socially, economically or physically possible (e.g. for elections)."38 Governments may also "promote and select certain areas of return and/or sectoral preferences that may be neither a priority for communities nor viable. This may contradict a fundamental right of those in voluntary repatriation (i.e. free movement- the right to choose where one return to within national boundaries)."39
UNHCR has highlighted the importance of taking into account the productive capacities of returnees,40 and more generally their positive contribution to the society may have an impact on the countrys rebuilding efforts. "When reintegration is not sustainable many returnees may opt to return to their country of asylum...Reintegration of displaced populations need not represent an economic burden, instead these populations should be seen as a human capital that can contribute to the recovery process by becoming productive members of the society."41
To respond to these challenges, UNHCR has suggested that, refugees and IDPs can be supported to participate in peace processes which "define the terms of their return and reintegration and which enable them to access and negotiate legal frameworks covering issues such as land, property and minority rights."42 Additionally, the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) can work with the respective national government to define an overall framework and clear objectives for the transition. This framework should address broader macro-economic concerns; communicate concerns to the government regarding areas of return that are less than optimal; and seek to balance governmental preferences for infrastructure interventions with the livelihood needs of communities.43 Go to Strategic Frameworks
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Linking livelihoods training with realities on the ground, the needs of the market and the wider development visionLivelihoods/skills training programs frequently fail to connect with the realities on the ground, including market demands and the wider development vision that a post-conflict government is setting. Either newly acquired vocational skills are not relevant to demands in returnees communities of origin (meaning there is not a need for their work) or infrastructure, institutions and resources have been so destroyed during the conflict that there is no platform for employment.
Humanitarian organizations have traditionally approached the issue of livelihoods and self-reliance from a technical perspective, focusing on the effective design and implementation of income-generating projects, micro-credit programmes, agriculture and vocational training programmes, amongst other initiatives. Some have noted that while this technical perspective is important, in addition to the obvious issue of financial resources, there is also a need to link the question of livelihoods with the issues of rights and protection.44 This will help to ensure that the economic aspects of recovery address likely causes of conflict, and support social inclusion, reconciliation, and ultimately peace consolidation.
Even if refugees have received excellent skills training while displaced, their new skills do not necessarily respond to livelihood opportunities upon return to their communities of origin. The post-conflict environment may still be in disarray and economic structures may not be functioning when refugees return home. In order for returnees to create viable livelihoods, there must be "purchasing power," infrastructure for production and transport and usable resources.45 For example, in a study of livelihood programs in Liberia, the Womens Commission for Refugee Women and Children found that "the majority of projects lack direct links to current or emerging market demand. Market assessments are largely absent from project design and hence, programs are seldom market-driven."46 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) further underscores, "In contexts where the economy is not expanding and/or there are few donor-supported public works or reconstruction projects, graduates of training programs may have few opportunities to use their skills."47
Ideally programs should incorporate follow-on opportunities, such as the formation of cooperatives, micro-credit programs, or apprenticeships that promote livelihoods. In addition to employment opportunities and market accessibility, the availability of land and other inputs, and money in circulation are other factors needed to ensure that training contributes to lasting peace and recovery.48
[Back to Top] 49 While conflict in such cases may have social and/or political roots, in reintegration settings it can often erupt over economic or livelihood related issues and concerns, such as land, other resources and/or property ownership disputes. Returnees may face dislocation as they find others living in their homes or no homes to return to. Moreover, returnees may find themselves living side-by-side with those they only recently confronted as enemies.50 Go to Activities: Land and Property
When internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees return to their homes, their arrival may put "tremendous pressure on resources, food and shelter..." resulting in the local community feeling overwhelmed. 51 There can also be tension between returnees from urban areas and their relatives who stayed in the village during the war, but returnees may have gained new skills that are valued in the community. And those returning to rural areas from urban centers may have more difficulty reintegrating due to fewer choices and facilities.52 UNHCR highlights that were returnees are not of the dominant identity group in a community they are returning to, they may be unwelcome and subject to violence, or they may experience discrimination in housing or employment that makes it impossible for them to support themselves or their families. "In such instances, sustainable return and reintegration is severely compromised."53 Governments and local authorities may also perceive returnees as disruptive and potentially bringing violence into the community.54
Economic recovery and development more broadly can be used as a tool to foster coexistence and even reconciliation. As noted by UNHCR: "To achieve coexistence communities and individuals require the capacity and determination to recognize each others status and rights as human beings; develop a just and inclusive vision for the community's future; and jointly plan, design and implement economic, social, cultural, or political development across former community divides."55
[Back to Top] 56 Returnees, according to UNHCR, often repatriate to remote, marginal and poor areas and communities. Returnee areas are "frequently affected by policies that limit access to agricultural lands and natural resources (e.g. water). An inadequate absorption capacity of areas of return can jeopardize reintegration."57
A second issue facing refugees and IDPs from rural areas involves return from displacement in urban areas. Displaced persons who lived in urban areas during displacement may be reluctant to return to remote areas, and their skill sets may not be relevant to rural life, this is especially true for youth. "After many years of exile, the younger generation may not be willing to return to their parents place of origin in remote areas (they may lack farming skills) and may try to move to urban areas."58
According to UNHCR, a possible strategy for addressing this reluctance to return to rural areas is to use tools, such as Participatory Rural Appraisals, to determine the needs of the community, empower the community through participation and support coexistence. "This builds the foundation for sustained participation in on-going decision making and ultimately provides the basis for democratic involvement and demand for better governance."59 Other responses advocated by UNHCR are to: "Invest in upgrading structures and facilitates in returnee areas; advocate for the inclusion of these areas in development programmes; plan short-term quick interventions according to long-term objectives; when developing intervention strategies, reduce rural biases in reintegration and factor in skills training in the country asylum."60
Clearly, it is also vital for governments to ensure that issues of rural livelihoods constitute a priority in national development plans.
[Back to Top] 61 Refugees returning to their countries of origin spontaneously may not have accurate knowledge of the security situation and may not be eligible for follow-up support from their governments and international agencies.62
However, it is a fundamental principle of voluntary repatriation that refugees returning spontaneously be able to do so "at their own pace;' not be "arbitrarily separated from family members;" and "be treated with respect by national authorities, and [have] their rights...fully restored."63 According to UNHCR, there is often a wave of refugees returning to their countries of origin when they perceive that security has been established or following the end of violence and the signing of peace agreements. "It is important, therefore, to initiate preparations for return and reintegration earlier on in the country of asylum in order to prepare refugees for durable solutions (local integration, resettlement or voluntary repatriation)."64 Additionally, "every effort should be made to provide accurate information on whether return is safe so that an informed choice can be made."65
[Back to Top] 66 Clearly, there are, dangerous consequences if refugees and IDPs return before security has been established or maintained. Link to Debates: Non-refoulement
Even after violence has officially ended in areas of return, there is always a risk that there will be a return to conflict. Areas of return are often near borders (perhaps even in contested zones) and may have military presence, a high incidence of landmines and banditry or armed elements within communities. "Security conditions may change rapidly and be fluid over a long period of time, making it difficult to access areas to plan for operations."67 Additionally, "The sustainable return of IDPs is predicated on continued stability in areas of return. Should the security situation deteriorate, this will affect the return and reintegration of IDPs and may cause further displacement."68
In response to the protection of refugees, UNHCR alongside the UN family as a whole is increasingly committed to engaging in core protection-related activities that support the restoration of national protection and the rule of law, including returnee monitoring. Such activities focus on addressing protection needs that are linked to the ongoing effects of conflict and displacement, i.e. mechanisms to secure land and property rights, ensure safe places of return, access to national documentation, non-discriminatory access to services, respect for minority rights, prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence, and legal assistance.69 According to UNHCR, it is also key to involve returnee communities, the police, the military, human rights commissions, NGOs and national and local governments.70
1. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee, "Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy: UNHCRs Role in Support of the Return and Reintegration of Displaced Populations" (Geneva: UNHCR, February 18, 2008), 4.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. United States Agency for International Development, Community-Focused Reintegration (Washington, D.C.: USAID), 9, pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf.
4. United Nations Security Council, "Solutions to Refugee Problem Common Responsibility, Require Adequate Resources, Rudd Lubbers Tells Security Council," United Nations Website, Press Release SC/8099, May 20, 2004.
5. United Nations Development Programme, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)," UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery.
6. USAID, Community-Focused Reintegration, 5.
7. Ibid., 25.
8. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern," (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2003), 4, and Sue Emmott, "A Practitioner's View of the Relief-Development Divide in Post-Taliban Afghanistan" (Aotearoa, New Zealand: paper presented at the 3rd Biennial Conference of the International Development Studies Network of Aotearoa, New Zealand, December 5-7, 2006).
9. Emmott, "A Practitioner's View of The Relief-Development Divide in Post-Taliban Afghanistan."
11. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy,. 5.
12. Joanna Macrae, "Aiding Peace...and War: UNHCR, Returnee Reintegration, and the Relief-Development Debate," Working Paper Number 14 (London: Overseas Development Institute, December 1999), 1.
13. Macrae, "Aiding Peace...and War," 13.
14. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, 5.
15. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities," (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004), 2.8.
16. Smillie, "Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy," xv.
17. Macrae, "Aiding Peace...and War," 24.
18. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, 7.
19. Ibid., 7.
20. Ibid., 1.
21. Ibid., 10.
22. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 1.6.
23. The World Bank PCF, "Workshop on Closing the Gap on Community Reintegration Activities," 4.
24. Ibid., 4.
25. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, 9.
26. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 1.6.
27. Ibid., 1.24.
28. Food and Agricultural Organization, "Gender: Key to Sustainability and Food Security: Plan of Action: Gender and Development" (Rome: FAO, 2003), 6.
29. Leslie Groves, "UNHCR Accountability Framework for Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming: First Global Analysis" (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007), 2.
30. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Capacity-Building," UNHCR.
31. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Part IV: Activities and Tools for Protection. Guidance Note 4: Capacity Building," (Genvea: UNHCR, December 1, 2007), 108.
32. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "A Practical Guide to Capacity Building as a Feature of UNHCRs Humanitarian Programmes" (Geneva: UNHCR, 4), 4.
33. Macrae, "Aiding Peace...and War", 24.
34. Ibid., 24-25.
35. Ibid., 28.
36. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, 11.
37. UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern, 4.
38. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 1.22.
39. Ibid., 1.22.
40. UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern, 20.
41. Ibid., 20.
42. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, 10.
43. UNHCR. Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 2004, 1.22.
44. Machtelt De Vriese, "Refugee Livelihoods: A Review of the Evidence," EPAU/2006/04 (Geneva: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 2006), 7; Jeffrey Crisp, "UNHCR, Refugee Livelihoods and Self-reliance: A Brief History" (Geneva: paper presented at UNHCRs Executive Committee, September 2003).
45. Sara Pantuliano et al. "The Long Road Home: Opportunities and Obstacles to the Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees Returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas" (London: Overseas Development Institute, August 2007), 8.
46. Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, "Build the Peace: Creating Economic Opportunities for Post-conflict Liberia" (New York: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, June 2007), 3.
47. USAID, Community-Focused Reintegration, 27.
48. Ibid., 27.
49. The Brookings Institute, "When Displacement Ends: A Framework for Durable Solutions," (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, May 2007), 5-6.
50. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Quick Impact Projects (QiPs): A Provisional Guide" (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004), 19.
51. Pantuliano et al. "The Long Road Home," 7.
52. Ibid., 7.
53. Eileen Babbitt et al., "Imagine Coexistence: Assessing Refugee Reintegration in Divided Communities," (Medford: Tufts University, July 2002), 5, fletcher.tufts.edu/chrcr/pdfs/imagine.pdf.
54. UNHCR, "Quick Impact Projects (QiPs): A Provisional Guide," 19.
55. Ibid., 19.
56. UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern, 21.  Ibid.
57. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 1.23.
58. Ibid., 1.23.
59. The World Bank PCF, "Workshop on Closing the Gap on Community Reintegration Activities," 5.
60. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 1.23.
61. IRIN, "The Long Journey Home: An IRIN Web Special on the Challenge of Refugee Return and Reintegration," February 2005, 7.
62. Pantuliano et al. "The Long Road Home," 11.
63. The Reach Out Refugee Protection Training Project, "Module 9: Durable Solutions," in Reach Out Refugee Protection Training Kit (2005), 5.
64. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 4.1.
65. The Reach Out Refugee Protection Training Project, "Module 9: Durable Solutions," 2.
66. Macrae, "Aiding Peace...and War," 28.
67. UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, 1.23.
68. Pantuliano et al. "The Long Road Home," 15.
69. UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, 13.
70. Ibid., 13.