Community Policing: Definitions & Conceptual Issues

What is community policing?

For over a decade, community policing has been increasingly incorporated as a component or an overall model in the reform of policing organizations in post-authoritarian and post-conflict environments. Yet, the term defies precision and has been subject to a variety of different interpretations and applications, such as policing community forums, neighborhood crime watch schemes, beat patrols, sector policing, etc. Indeed, some authors refer to community policing as "community-based policing," "community-generated policing," "partnership policing," or "democratic policing," but often with different connotations.1

Community policing scholar Michael Brogden notes that community policing is typically defined by what its not"it is not military-style policing with a central bureaucracy, it is not policing that is autonomous of public consent and accountability, it is not primarily to reactive crime-fighting strategies, and it is not policing measured by output in terms of professional efficiency (e.g. the number of arrests made).2

The most wide-spread definition of community policing in peacebuilding

The most widespread definition of community policing used by various actors in peacebuilding, considers the term "a philosophy and an organizational strategy" that seeks to promote a collaborative relationship between the community and local police organizations to prevent and solve the problem of crime and social disorder, and allows law abiding community members a greater voice in setting priorities and involvement in efforts to improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods.3 In this sense, community policing is rationalized as a way for the police to become more integrated in community culture and to increase public support.  This definition is influenced by the Anglo-American approach to community policing. 

Go to Anglo-American Community Policing

According to this definition, community policing aims to bring state institutions closer to the community and civil society through a consultative process.  Community policing has evolved from a growing demand for policing approaches that are more responsive, effective, and accountable to the communities that it serves. In 1994, based on data collected from Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, international criminal justice specialist David Bayley found four recurring elements that needed to be present anytime police agencies changed their traditional practices: (1) consultation: with communities about their security needs and police assistance required in meeting them; (2) adaptation: of organisational structures to allow local operational commanders greater decision-making powers; (3) mobilization: of public and private non-police agencies and individuals; and (4) problem-solving: to ameliorate the conditions generating crime and insecurity.4

The elements of community policing described above entail that law enforcement organizations foster positive relationships with a variety of social actors (e.g. government and non-governmental actors, the community, as well as with public and private security). The core logic is that "innovative police practices can mobilize now latent informal mechanisms of social control embedded within community life."5 Most of the literature notes that community policing marks a shift away from the "state-centric, top-down model" of policing to a more "community-centric, decentralized approach," embedded in "civic-communitarian traditions."6 In addition, this understanding of community policing emphasizes a problem-solving approach, whereby law enforcement officials are expected to focus on solving the causes of the problems rather than reacting or dealing with the symptoms.

Alternative definitions: community policing as a wide-range of activities

At one end of the spectrum, community policing can refer to indigenous forms of informal policing or community-based groups such as militias, vigilante groups, self-defense committees, and "people's court" that have filled the gap where weak or failing states have been unable to provide sufficient forms of formal police to adequately protect citizens from crime.  These groups work in a variety of ways, at times in partnership with official police, to confront local problems of crime and insecurity. These informal structures can be described as a form of community policing in that they are concerned with the protection of a particular community, either politically or ethnically defined.

In the middle of spectrum are activities that are also considered a form of community policing, whereby the community creates groups alongside or in collaboration with formal police institutions in an effort to prevent crime. Neighborhood watches and "block watches" are activities that rely on building the community support on a neighborhood basis and are dependent on awareness, communication, and crime prevention to police the area. At the other end of the spectrum is community policing as conceived by Anglo-American policing circles. Community policing in this respect generally refers to policing in the community. This means that police structures are closer to the people in the community and implies that there is greater visibility and accessibility of the police. Police-community forums and local dispute resolution committees are seen to be forms of community policing within this domain. 

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Policing, the state, and public order

Historical origins of the means to ensure public order

Western notions of contemporary policing have roots in early Greek and Roman conceptions of the state and the means of ensuring public order.  The Roman approach to maintaining public order emphasized the controlling role of the state over its population through a centralized and military force.  However, public order did not rely solely on external means for its control; rather Roman society was also self-regulating.  In contrast, the means of ensuring public order in fifth century Greece was more decentralized and operated closer to the community.  For the Greeks, social control was a collective endeavor based on self-help, kinship, and communality, since early models of what is now considered to be proto-forms of policing were limited to only the execution of legal process on behalf of the communities of the polis.7  Considerations of the level of use of force necessary to maintain public order also originated from early modern philosophical thought about the concepts of progress and social control.  For instance, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume believed that the only way to avoid anarchy was to have people consent to authority placed over them.8 Later, this idea gave way to more utilitarian notions of social, legal, and administrative reform in the 19th century.  Advocates of utilitarianism believed that actions should produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.9  And this concept has been continually played out in considerations about the role of the police and the tensions between balancing liberty and maintaining order. 

Go to Introduction to Security and Public Order

Policing and the modern state

The two divergent models of policing in classical antiquity reflect the distinctions that currently exist between the kind of policing employed in Continental Europe and Britain, and the United States.  The historical influences of Roman policing and the unsuccessful attempts of the police in managing mass demonstrations in the 18th century led to a preference for military-like police forces in Europe.  In countries like France and the Netherlands, the Maréchausée"a type of military police that later evolved into the Gendarmerie Nationale"were used for patrolling and controlling order.10  In contrast, policing in the United Kingdom has been decentralized and there has been a strong tradition of local policing.  The decline in the use of the military to deal with problems of public order led to the development of the professional police in the United Kingdom, which in turn, influenced the policing structures in the United States.  Interestingly, countries that have a different history than the West also have elements of policing that fall somewhere within the range of the Greek and Roman models.  For example, policing during the Soviet era was likened to "an extreme form of the Roman model,"11 where the police not only dealt with crime but also exercised power directly on behalf of the state.  In Japan, the relationship between the police and citizens is consensual and reciprocal.  Policing functions is spread through various civil institutions and there is the high degree of citizen involvement in crime prevention activities, which is somewhat similar to the Greek model.12

Different notions of public order and policing

Different types of states will ascribe to different interpretations of the term "order" with different ideas about the role of police in managing "disorder."13  For example, authoritarian forms of government have been generally more interested in the promotion of order for the protection of the security of the state rather than the protection of individual citizens.  Under extreme forms of authoritarian rule, the role of policing implies only promoting and protecting the regime in power.  In contrast, democratic states the promotion of public order has meant that police comply with the law, be accountable, and respect human rights.  However, the degree of impartiality depends on the discretion of the state.14

The scholar Alan Wright articulates four types of public order policing that elaborates the relationship between the state, police forces and the military:15

  • Civil police model: Characterized by plurality of state and non-state associations. The powers and objectives of the civil police and the military are clearly defined.  The civil police are responsible for crime and other risks and keeping the peace.  The role of the military is to defend the society from external aggressors.  The police in this model do not fulfill a state function where the government directly controls their actions.  In contrast, the military is characterized by politically conceived objectives, orders and strict rules of engagement.
  • State police model: The concerns of the state tend to predominate in this model.  There is some separation of powers and objectives between the police and the military.  Although the rule of law still applies, many aspects of policing are considered to be within the domain of the state rather than autonomous from it. 
  • Quasi-military police model: Characterized by a monolithic state where the concerns of the state dominate all others.  In this model, the police and the military share most of their powers and objectives.  Although the police are responsible for investigating and preventing crime, they are also directly responsible for the security of the state in pursuing its enemies.  There is no attempt to ensure a separation of powers.  In the most extreme sense, such as in a totalitarian state, the police do not require to legitimize their actions through the rule of law. The achievement of the states political goals is the key objective for effective action.
  • Martial law model: Characterized by total political control of the state.  In this model, there is no separation of powers and objectives between the police and the military.  The police are under military command and control and are subjected to military law. 
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Policing vs. community policing

The difference between traditional forms of policing and community policing is that the police is no longer the sole guardians of law and order, and all the members of a community become active partners with the collective effort of enhancing the safety and security of neighborhoods.16

Anglo-American community policing

In the late 1970s to early 1980s, community policing became a buzz word in Anglo-American policing circles, replacing terms such as "police-community relations", "team policing", and "problem-oriented policing."17 Policing experts Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux first argued that community policing fostered "quality police-community relationships" through increased communication between citizens and law enforcement officers, since the police were traditionally a reactive organization that responded only to calls for service. Policing scholar, John Crank noted that the police reform movement dealt with the problem of legitimacy in the 1960s by invoking two powerful myths: the myth of the 18th century morally invested "small town" American community and the myth of police officers as community watchmen.18

The elements and philosophy of Anglo-American community policing first emerged in the works of John Alderson and Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux. Alderson approached the topic of community policing more conceptually and offered 10 principles of policing "under conditions of freedom which emphasized the guarantee of personal freedom and free passage."19 In contrast, Trojanowicz and Bucquerouxs work was geared toward the practical nature of community policing and provided ten elements related to the implementation of the concept in a given police force.20 However, it was only in 1992 that a definition of community policing was articulated by policing specialist, Robert Friedmann. He defined the term as "a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime causing conditions. This assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision making, and greater concern for civil rights and liberties."21 This definition is more comprehensive in scope than earlier manifestations of the term which were initially understood to only denote increased foot patrol within communities.

Reactions to the concept of Anglo-American community policing

Criminology and criminal justice scholar Bill Dixon remarked on the vast differences in interpretation of the Anglo-American notions of community policing, pointing out that some critics have claimed that the term is really only a euphemism that gives a common identity to a diverse range of independent, if not disparate activities, whereas proponents like Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux argue it is a "new" philosophy of policing.22

Policing scholar Susan Miller commented that, "Community Policing [...] challenges the traditional policing paradigm." These new approaches reject the "aloof, authoritarian, detatched model of the police officer, and also reject the traditional policing style structured around random patrols and response to service calls [...]. Community policing has instead implicitly embraced 'feminine' qualities as ideal or superior traits for neighborhood officers to possess."23 Indeed, informal styles of policing are embraced by some advocates and seen to be more effective tools for enhancing recognition, trust, and support from community members.

However, scholar David Thatcher, in his analysis of community policing notes that, "Some scholars draw pessimistic conclusions from the idea that police and community values may conflict. Most radically, Peter Manning has suggested that community policing is fundamentally flawed partly because police and community values are incompatible. More moderately, a few researchers imply that although some community organizations may be viable police partners, others are unlikely to develop strong relationships with police because their goals are incompatible with the police mission."24

African approach to community policing

Researchers Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe have remarked that, "Security in many parts, and perhaps most of Africa, seems on the contrary, a unilateral action from the communities.  What is difficult to achieve in the United States and Western democracies in general exists in abundance, perhaps in excess, in African towns and villages.  There, community self-rule is ubiquitious, informal policing a net contributor to local safety enjoying popularity, whereas it is the state that appears distant to local residents and sometimes inhospitable."25  What Wisler and Onwudiwe are referring to is that while most analyst refer to community policing as a style of formal state policing, in Africa the kind of community policing that is generate is more informal or the "policing of everyday life" that operates outside the regulatory framework of the state.  When juxtaposed with the Weberian bureaucratic model, community policing within an African context has a dubious legitimacy.26  However, the state in Africa is often problematic, sometimes irrelevant, whereas informal policing bring towns and villages the otherwise absent public good of security.27 At the same time, attempts to fully adopt Anglo-American style community policing have been difficult to implement due to the inherent weakness of the state and law enforcement insitituions, high levels of criminality, corruption, and limited trust of the population in the police. 

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Divergent international approaches to community policing

It is important to remember that there is no universally agreed upon definition of community policing among the actors (both international and domestic) involved in police reform in peacebuilding.  While some elements of Robert Friedmann's definition are reflected in contemporary notions of community policing as conceived by international donors, the most pervasive elements include: (1) the creation of effective partnerships with the community, private and public sectors, (2) the application of problem solving, and (3) the transformation of police organization and culture to support the philosophical shift (4) a decentralization of police organizations.

Security expert Mark Malan notes that, "the advocacy of community policing is underpinned by a long-running debate over different models and styles of policing which tend to be aligned on the axis of force versus service or control versus care.  In the formal model, police responsibilities centre around crime control and the maintenance of order; while in the latter the emphasis is on the service functions that the police may provide in terms of protection against crime, victim support and the safeguarding of citizens rights.  Community policing leans towards the second style of policing."28

In practice, international police officers and donor have taken rather divergent approaches.  In some cases, a more communitarian approach of getting closer to and working in tandem with the community is encouraged. In other circumstances, international police officers interpret community policing as allowing the community to police themselves with limited involvement by the local police force.29 For example, in Swaziland, the term "community policing" has been used since the mid-1990s to describe civilians who undertake certain duties in policing local crime. These civilian community police have been criticized for treating suspects brutally and taking the law into their own hands. Although some civilian community police have been arrested and charged as a result, there has been no effort to disband these units.  The civilian community police seem to be linked to the regular Swazi police forces through crime prevention officers stationed at both headquarters and regional level.30

Community policing in Nepal

The police in Nepal have a history of using authoritarian style of management that has been inherited from the military.  The reformation of the current police organization occurred from 1951 to 1952 as a result of the amalgamation of militias"the Rakshya Dal and Janamukti Sena, and rebel insurgents who took up arms against the Rana regime.  Up until the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990, the sole objective of the police was to support the political regime in power, and service to the citizens was of secondary concern.  Repression of civilian and political rights was widespread.

A form of community policing known as the Chhimeki Prahari system of policing was first introduced in Nepal in 1982, based on the experiences of Singapores Neighborhood Police Post model. The objectives were to establish a number of police posts in the Kathmandu Valley and for police to patrol the areas and respond to public grievances.  There was varying degrees of support in police headquarters for this system.  Similarly, in 1994, more than 100 community police center was piloted in the Kathmandu Valley, but received little police or government support.  The partnership approach was largely unsuccessful since the Maoist insurgency, suspicious that local communities were collaborating with law enforcement officials, would often target these police posts and community centers.  The attacks prevented the majority of centers in the Kathmandu Valley from operating.

There have been only a few studies on the lessons derived from these early experiences with community policing.  A 1997 Study Committee of Nepal police noted that community policing projects could not be successful in the long-term unless they had the support of high-ranking police officers, and clear policy guidelines, mandates and plans of operation.  The police were also considered to lack the required level of knowledge and skills to run community policing schemes, the necessary resources, and did not monitor and evaluate the mechanism appropriately to allow for accountability on the part of the police to the communities.       

Source: Saferworld, Policing in Nepal: A Collection of Essays, (London: Saferworld, September2007.
The absence of clear operational strategies on how to implement community policing in different cultural settings and contexts has meant that the kind of community policing introduced is dependent largely on the experiences and conceptual understanding of foreign donors.  However, many of these actors do not always have a clear idea of the type of police force they are trying to produce or reform, or whether their intervention sufficiently takes into account the local history, laws, political conditions and needs of the recipients. 

The literature describing the implementation of community policing programs is often silent as to why some approaches were chosen over others. As a result, some critics claim that any activity could be labeled community policing provided it is able to gain the support of the community.31 Arguably, community policing may not always be interpreted as a total transformation of the police, rather some have conceived it as an add-on to existing strategies (e.g. "zero tolerance policing"32--generally synonymous with an aggressive law enforcement approach) provided the community is amenable.33

Community policing as a catalyst for transformation

Among most intergovernmental organizations, community policing is regarded as a transformative catalyst capable of guiding the reform of the local police organizations in transitional, weak or failed states. The Anglo-American approach to community policing adopted by many Western donors in peacebuilding tend to incorporate principles of good governance and democracy, especially ideas of liberal pluralism, accountability, transparency, the rule of law, human rights, and economic efficiency associated with public management reform and performance management in local policing organizations.34 Policing is transformed into an impartial source of order rather than an instrument of a partisan government. The assumption is that the institutions and power structures in emerging, new, or restored democracies are more open to change than those in established democracies. In countries where law enforcement organizations have only served the regime in power, community policing activities has sought to de-politicize their roles, and in some cases, create a clear separation of duties between the military and the police. Thus, we have seen community policing incorporated in police reform programs from South Africa, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Serbia, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Kenya, Northern Ireland, to East Timor. Yet, viewing policing reform as a catalyst for democratic change might be overly ambitious. Some experts note that, "Police reform is necessary to allow the resumption and flourishing of democratic process, but it can neither create democracy nor succeed in an undemocratic environment. Police reform are dependent on, and not a determinant of democracy."35  Still other experts believe that community policing should not be synonymous with democratic policing at all since this approach takes a restrict view of governance which does not allow for one to see the full scope of challenges that face emerging democracies.36

In situations where domestic policing and judicial accountability and capacity have been eroded by protracted conflict and corruption, where civilians have been targeted by the state and/or rebel insurgents, and the state's policing sector has been expansive and intrusive, many Western donors have encouraged the use of community policing as part of the larger package of police reform either as a part of security sector reform (SSR), rule of law, or justice programs to help install some degree of stability, as well as to foster trust and legitimacy of law enforcement institutions.37 Indeed, Michael Brogden has noted that, "Where such societies are characterized by rising recorded crime rates, by delegitimizing of older criminal justice agencies, and where economic investments is handicapped by foreign investors' fear of social instability, police reform is perceived as the essential bedrock of social and economic progress."38 Yet, there has been little empirical evidence of the impact or effectiveness of community policing.  Otwin Marenin cautions that, "Since much advice and assistance on reform comes from outside the society, and the lessons offered to post-conflict have been learned from policing systems which were shaped by particular national histories, the aid offered may not fit the contexts into which they are introduced (that is obvious), even if it was good advice, it may not work in the same way as they did in the context from which the lessons were extracted (which is less obvious).  Unless the forces and reasons why, for example community based policing worked well in one society may not exist in another."39

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Community policing as a source of legitimacy

Community policing can provide a source of legitimacy for police activity in terms of community protection when legitimacy in terms of police professionalization had been lost.40

Bill Dixon argues that the Anglo-American definition of community policing makes it evident that the state or public police are central to this activity. Although communities provide input into how the police can improve their security needs, the responsibility still remains with the law enforcement organizations, particularly local commanders to make decisions, mobilize the public and private sector, and ameliorate conditions that lead to crime and insecurity.41 Despite the communitarian rhetoric, community policing is still police-led and state-centric. Policing expert, William Lyons has argued that sometimes community policing does not empower communities, rather just the opposite"it empowers police through legitimacy, and uses the community as a resource to solve problems.42

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The expansion of policing roles

The practice of exporting policing models to peripheral societies of the South or countries in transition is not new. There has been a long legacy of policing under conditions of "colonial hegemony" from Britain, France, and Japan.43 In addition, post-World War II attempts to export United States-style policing to the defeated Axis powers are also well-known, as are the massive civilian police training and advising programs administered in 1962 by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to developing countries as a form of aid.44 Police institutions are increasingly regarded as important to stability in the aftermath of conflict or during conditions of rapid social change and transformation. In areas where police reforms have been implemented they tend to be used to dismantle authoritarian forms of police institutions and to move regime policing to so-called "democratic policing."45  Nevertheless, scholars such as Graham Ellison and Conor O'Reilly have argued that the export of policing models, such as transplanting the Northern Irish model of policing to Iraq, often overlooks historical continuities and discontinuities in the policy transfer process.46

Peacebuilding scholars Charles Call and Michael Barnett have charted the veritable rise in international civilian police (CIVPOL) in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations from the late 1980s to late 1990s, which have collapsed the boundaries between international security and domestic security.47 The Report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) in 2000 has also recommended a need for a "doctrinal shift" to emphasize greater security measures.48 Thus, across the board, the policing space has been broadened, stretched, and deepened with the growth of transnational and international policing regimes.49 UN CIVPOL missions are typically guided by similar objectives--ensuring that local law enforcement officers and institutions respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.50

During the "first-generation" of peacekeeping operations, UN military troops were deployed and frequently assumed policing roles. However, only the UN operations in the Congo and in Cyprus, both dating from the early 1960s, contained UN civilian police components. The classic UN CIVPOL concept draws on the experience of police officers from UN member states and deploys them to conflict regions and expects them to perform a host of activities geared at creating law and order conditions necessary for sustainable peace. In Namibia, CIVPOLs assisted in monitoring election and screening and monitoring local police. In El Salvador, CIVPOL monitored human rights abuses and helped recruit, screen and train a completely new police force. In Angola, CIVPOL monitored the demobilization of UNITA forces and the disarmament of civilian police forces. In Cambodia, they provided public security as part of the UNs assumption of state functions. And, in Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia, CIVPOL monitored agreements to integrate ethnic minorities into the police.51

The changing relationship between traditional or Weberian notions of policing52 and the local population raise complex questions about the nature of accountability in a global context. Yet, most international donors still ascribe to Weberian notions of policing and assume that that if effective policing structures can be established, then state institutions can be given the space to develop new legitimate structures.53 This has led international organizations to expand the roles of international police forces and to push for reforms of law enforcement organizations. Community policing have increasingly become part and parcel of peacebuilding activities either as a part of a program implemented by CIVPOL or international donors, or as an indigenous process. Community policing has also increasingly adopted a rights-based discourse, piggy-backing on to human rights issues. For instance, community policing has been promoted as a solution to the level of police and civilian deaths in Brazil, and as a human rights response to the treatment of Roma minorities.54

For instance, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have placed the development or reform of policing institutions, especially in the direction of community policing, as one of the conditions for transitional countries to receive economic assistance. International civil police forces have also initiated community policing activities or trained local law enforcement organizations on how to implement community policing as part of their mandate. However, the question still remains what constitutes "effective" policing structures and to what extent can democratic policing norms be adapted in different political and cultural contexts to succeed? 

[Back to Top] Community police intervention patrols (PIP-COM) in El Salvador

Although the U.S. funded program known as the Community Police Intervention Patrols (PIP-COM) in the late 1990s to early 2000s, fell under the rubric of community policing initiatives in El Salvador, the program used a targeted and active patrolling method on regular routes. PIP-COM helped to lower crime rates considerably in neighborhoods where it was implemented, but the program demonstrates the challenges of transforming the mentality of police officers. Although the PIP-COM agent encouraged citizens to fill out contact cards to gather information on suspects in the neighborhoods, some agents used the cards to collect data on all citizens whom they had contact, including the victims. And while regular meetings were held between PIP-COM agents and the community, they generally sought to gather information rather than respond to community concerns.

Source: Charles T. Call, Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador, Journal of Latin American Studies, 35, no. 4 (November 2003): 827-862.

The dilemmas of transforming institutionalized power

The structural danger in community policing is that unless local police organizations are already perceived as loyal civil servants, devoid of corruption, and do not interfere in politics, reforming police institutions in politically-volatile and complex environments will be destabilizing, especially if police forces have catered to various interests other than the public. Shifting or decentralizing power within institutions inevitably creates winners and losers in the process. Thus, policing reform is fundamentally a political process since it deals with state-civil society interactions and has a strong symbolic component.

Rachel Neild has pointed out that in El Salvador and Guatemala, local actors trying to undermine or evade personnel changes at the top of the police hierarchy either recommended or imposed by international advisors, responded with a so-called "shell game" where they placed real power with individuals in other positions in the force or even outside of it, weakened the chain of command and responsibility, and allowed discredited officials to continue their influence over the police organization.55

In examining the role of governance in security, one automatically focuses on the means and processes by which security is sought and governed. For instance, if populations have primarily sought informal means (e.g. militias, vigilante groups, self-defense committees) to guarantee their security, then what are the values protected by informal agency, and what are the means that exist for the democratic governance of non-state security systems?56 Moreover, if security is perceived to be imposed by international donor agency interventions or through development aid, then how will the suggested reforms work or remain sustainable?

The creation of alternative institutions and alternative principles in social order is particularly problematic at the level of attitudes and affective orientation. At the community level, social order is often related to the assertion of power by a dominant party. The weakening of the party or groups accounts for greater fragmentation and disorder in the communities. The police have great difficulties coping with these types of communities as order and stability cannot be maintained by force alone. Moreover, the implementation of community policing in post-conflict environments is a function of the security conditions on the ground, political support from the government, local population, and civil society organizations for the reform, sufficient resources, manpower, and training.

1. South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Philosophy and principles of community-based policing (Belgrade: SEESAC, 2003), 2.
2. Michael Brogden and Preeti Nijhar, Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2005), 1-2.
3. See: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships (Vienna: OSCE, May 2008), 5; Bureau of Justice Assistance, "Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action" (Monograph, Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC, 1994), vii.
4. Bill Dixon, The Globalization of Democratic Policing.
5. William Lyons, The Politics of Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1999), 38.
6. Frank Harris, The Role of Capacity Building in Police Reform (Pristina, Kosovo: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo, 2005), 21-22.
7. Alan Wright, Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2001), 51-55.
8. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Classics, 1982 (first printed in 1651)); John Locke, Two Treaties of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (first published 1689)); David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 (first published1751)).
9. John Stuart Mills, Utilitarianism. Edited by George Sher (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1979 (First printed in 1863)).; Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 (first published 1789)).
10. Alan Wright, Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice, 62.
11. Ibid., 63.
12. C. Fenwick, "Law Enforcement, Public Participation and Crime Control in Japan"Implications for American Policing," American Journal of Police, 3:1 (1983): 87-109.
13. Ibid., 55.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 64-66.
16. Bureau of Justice Assistance, "Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action" (Monograph, Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC, 1994).
17. See: John Alderson, Policing Freedom: A Commentary on the Dilemmas of Policing in Western Democracies (Plymouth: Macdonalds & Evans, 1979); Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux. Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1990); Robert Friedmann, Community Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects (New York: St Martins Press, 1992); and Dennis Rosenbaum (ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1994).
18. John P. Crank, "Watchman and Community: Myth and Institutionalization in Policing," Law & Society, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1994).
19. John Alderson, Policing Freedom.
20. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, Community Policing.
21. Robert Friedmann, Community Policing, 4.
22. Bill Dixon, The Globalization of Democratic Policing: Sector Policing and Zero Tolerance in the new South Africa (Cape Town: The Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 2000).
23. Susan L. Miller, Gender and Community Policing (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 68.
24. David Thatcher, "Conflicting values in Community Policing," Law and Society Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2001): 769.
25. Dominque Wisler and Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe, "Community Policing in Comparison," Police Quarterly, 11, no. 4 (2008): 427.
26. Wisler and Onwudiwe, "Community Policing in Comparison," 428.
27. Ibid.
28. Mark Malin, "Police Reform in South Africa: Peacebuilding without Peacekeepers," African Security Review, 8, no. 3 (1999).
29. Mobekk, Eirin, Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions, Policy Paper No. 9 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), November 2005).
30. Amnesty International, Policing to protect human rights: A survey of police practice in countries of the Southern African Development Community, 1997-2002 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2002), Chapter 6.
31. Barry J. Ryan, "What the Police are Supposed to Do: Contrasting Expectations of Community Policing in Serbia," Policing and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1, 2007): 2.
32. This term refers to when rule of law is given priority over police discretion and certain low-level crimes are given specific attention. For a discussion of zero tolerance policing and country examples see: Jayne Marshall, "Zero Tolerance Policing," (Information Bulletin, no. 9, The South Australian Office of Crime Statistics & Research (OCSAR), 1999); Bill Dixon. "Zero Tolerance: The Hard Edge of Community Policing," African Security Review, 9, no. 3 (2000).
33. Here, David Bayley disagrees with this notion. See: David Bayley, "Community Policing: The Doctrine" (Paper for the Police Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, May 2005).
34. Barry J. Ryan, "What the Police are Supposed to Do," 2.
35. Rachel Neild, "Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies," Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 2001).
36. Clifford Shearing with Jennifer Wood, "Toward Democratic Policing: Rethinking Strategies of Transformation," paper for the Policing in Emerging Democracies workshop, National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, Washington, D.C, 1995, 31.
37. Michael Brogden, "Implementing Community Policing in South Africa: A Failure of History, and of Theory," Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (October 2002): 166.
38. Michael Brogden and Preeti Nijhar, Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2005), 3.
39. Otwin Marenin, "Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects," DCAF Occasional Paper 7, 2005: 58-59.
40. Carl Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, In Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality, J. Greene and S. Mastrosfski.  (New York: Praeger, 1988).
41. Bill Dixon, The Globalization of Democratic Policing.
42. Lyons, The Politics of Community Policing.
43. Bill Dixon, The Globalization of Democratic Policing.
44. See: Brogden and Nijhar, Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches, 3; Andrew Goldsmith and Sinclair Dinnen, "Transnational Police Building: Critical Lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 6 (September 2007), 1094.
45. Brogden and Nijhar. Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches, 4.
46. Graham Ellison and Conor OReilly. "From Empire to Iraq and the War on Terror: The Transplantation and Commodification of the (Northern) Irish Policing Experience." Police Quarterly, 11, no. 4, (2008): 395-426.
47. Call and Barnett, "Looking for a Few Good Cops."
48. United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. (New York: United Nations, 21 August 2000).
49. Otwin Marenin, "Building a Global Police Studies Community," Police Quarterly, Vol. 8. No. 1 (2005).
50. Codes of conduct for police officers include the Council of Europe code of ethics, UN codes on police conduct and the use of force, CIVPOL operational standards, and OSCE guidelines.
51. Call and Barnett, "Looking for a Few Good Cops," 49.
52. Denoting that police organizations are merely a part of the states bureaucratic apparatus to exercise its monopoly of coercion and achieve political goals, rather than institutions that are relatively autonomous.  The term is derived from Webers notion of the bureaucratization of the police.  See: Mathieu Deflem. Policing World Society: Historical Foundation of International Police Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 18-19.
53. Brogden and Nijhar. Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches, 5.
54. Laure-Hélène Piron and Francis Watkins, DFID Human Rights Review: A Review of How DFID has Integrated Human Rights into its Work, (London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2004).
55. Rachel Neild, "Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies," Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 2001).
56. Marenin, "Building a Global Police Studies Community," 123.



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