Public Administration, Local Governance & Participation: Case Studies
[Back to Top] 1 This coup was also made successful by the awarding of mining contracts in exchange for support from natural resource investors. However, almost as soon as Laurent Kabila, leader of the AFDL, took office, and the former Zaire became the DRC, the country was almost immediately plunged into renewed conflict when, in 1998, Kabila attempted to force out foreign troops. As a result, Rwanda and Uganda came together in attempts to overthrow Kabila, who was equally backed by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.2 Rwanda and Uganda exercised control over much of Eastern Congo, backing the the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), largely in in the Kivus, and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), mostly in Ituri. In fact, the reach of the RCD went so far as to control approximately one-third of Congolese territory.3 It was not until 2001, when Laurent Kabila was assassinated, and his son Joseph emerged as interim President, that steps were taken toward peace, with the allowance of a United Nations peacekeeping force (MONUC). Most forces left, or purported to have exited Congo by 2003, and the transitional government was established in the same year, with Joseph Kabila as president.4 Elections were held in 2006, with Kabila named as President, marking an end to the official transitional government.5
Given the long history of authoritarian rule, and subsequent conflict, the DRC is in need of drastic reforms in public administration and local governance systems. However, there are some central challenges to instituting such policies. Perhaps the most daunting issue is the prevalence of corrupt networks of patrons, outside of the control of central state authority. This problem is rooted in Congolese history. Similarly to Afghanistan, Congo has experienced the paradox of being formally a centralized state, but also relying on highly decentralized and informal networks outside the capital. While initially, Zaire was a control state under authority of the Mobutu regime, which captured rents from elite networks, changes in the geopolitical framework loosened support for Mobutu, and hence weakened his capacity to check rent-seeking elite activity.6 Instead, a system of 'Debrouillez-Vous!' a system that asked locals to 'fend for themselves.'7 The collapse of Mobutus regime, and capture of so much Congolese territory by external forces and armed groups only intensified this problem. Weakened security and incapacity to capture taxes upon resources makes it difficult for the state to provide services and appropriately train and pay public administration. As a result, the public administration extracts resources where it can and is "unable to provide the most rudimentary social services."8 For instance, "In most of DRC $94/$100 in administrative fees collected locally is illegal, and is pocketed, so citizens receive no services."9
Of course, offering power to local administrators is ultimately a much politicized issue in this context, with decentralization established as a long-standing debate in the Congo. As there exists significant fragmentation between groups and regions, proposals to decentralize also have ramifications to notions of citizenship and relationships between communities.
In attempts to modify this system, various institutions attempt to build and bolster programs aimed at anti-corruption, public administration reform, and are beginning the process of decentralization. Such actors include:
The Congolese state is currently divided into 10 provinces and one city, with plans to be decentralized into 26 new provinces by 2009.10 Laws and constitutional articles have been established to facilitate decentralization and civil service reform, including:
Constitution, Article 175, which stipulates that "the provinces are to manage 40 per cent of national tax revenue quadrupling their current budgets and allowing for substantial infrastructure investment."11
Law No. 81-003 which specified policies on civil service recruitment, pay, services, benefits, rights, duties, obligations and disciplinary measures.12
Civil society also has an important role in encouraging public participation, to build trust in institutions, a tenet which is seriously lacking in the DRC. Many organizations focus on transparency and integrityfor instance, Centre National d'Appui au Developpement et a la Participation Populaire (CENADEP) and Association Africaine de Defense des Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO) Katanga. However, civil society is still growing, and some of its components suffer from internal corruption as well.
Multilateral/Bilateral and International Financial Institutions.
International institutions have been instrumental in financing and providing technical support to these processes. Examples include:
The World Bank Interim Program and Enhanced Interim Program "finance urgent activities, including technical capacity building for the public administration and the rebuilding of the highway between Kinshasa and the seaport of Matadi."13
United Nations Development Programme, Governance Programme "supports the growth and poverty reduction strategy paper of the DRC and consists of five strategic governance components: political, administrative, economic, local, as well as legal and security issues. It is accordingly designed to lay the groundwork for the emergence of a strong state capable of boosting national unity and reconciliation; ensuring the security of its people and their property; increasing citizen access and participation in the political system; improving the performance of government administration and government agencies; enhancing the accessibility and quality of public services; and ensuring transparency and accountability in the management of public resources and services."14
Various cooperation agencies are also involved in reconstruction in the DRC. For instance, programs have been implemented that encourage holistic approaches to anti-corruption. The Innovative Resources Management model builds anti-corruption capacity by establishing participative Anti-Corruption Committees.15 Other organizations have focused on advocacy around a National Integrity System (for example, Chatham House, and Transparency International).16
The process of reconstruction in the DRC is likely to be a lengthily one, entailing the building of trust in local communities through a process of decentralization that adequately provides services through legitimate administrative channels. Such a process requires anti-corruption strategies, appropriate devolution of power and strong public administration reform. Some are wary of the rapid decentralization, which could trigger tensions and intensify inequity between regions.17 Additional concerns remain also around the states ability to stem corruption. In order to do this, "it will be necessary to identify the reformers and non-reformers in the Congolese political establishment. This mapping-out exercise will allow the development of strategies to get buy-in from an influential group of politicians who will act as the champions of the anti-corruption drive in the various governance reform programmes. It will also make it possible to find ways to defeat anti-corruption reformers. Communication will be key to the success of anti-corruption efforts. The public will need to be informed on a regular basis of the initiatives being undertaken, and an honest account of the successes and failures will need to be conveyed as well."18
Further, a bottom-up approach to processes of decentralization and anti-corruption is vital, wherein citizenry is empowered through such structures, various groups and civil society are included in decision-making, and populations find various governance levels accessible.19
For more information:
Brown, Michael. "A Hands on Model for Combating Corruption in Contexts of Extreme Poverty: Lessons from the Congo and Potential for Replicability in Africa and Beyond." Innovative Respources Management.
ICG. Congo: Consolidating the Peace. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007.
Innovative Resources Management/USAID. "Third Quarterly Report." Program for Linking Traditional Conflict Managers, Civil Society Actors, Armed Factions and Local Government Stakeholders to Reduce Conflict and Consolidate First Steps to Peace and Reconciliation, DRC, July 30, 2007.
Jackson, Stephen. "Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War Economy." Review of African Political Economy, no 93/94 (2002): 517-536.
Kodi, Muzong W. "Anti-Corruption Challenges in Post-Election Democratic Republic of Congo." The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, Africa Programme Report (January 2007).
Reno, William. "Congo: from state collapse to absolutism, to state failure." Third World Quarterly 27 no. 1 (2006): 43-56.
Tull, Denis. "A reconfiguration of political order? The state of the state in North Kivu (DR Congo)." African Affairs 102 (2003): 429-446.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Public Administration Country Profile. New York: UNDESA, 2007.
The World Bank/Democratic Republic of the Congo. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Kinshasa : World Bank : 2002.
Centre National dAppui au Dveloppement et la Participation Populaire
Programme des Nations Unies pour le Dveloppement, Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo
World Bank, DRC
Ligue Nationale pour les Elections Libres et Transparentes/National League for Free and Fair Elections
UNDP. "UNDP to sign $390 million governance programme with DRC." United Nations Development Programme Newsroom, January 25, 2008.
World Bank, DRC
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Sierra Leone in the period leading up to conflict embodied a neo-patrimonial state. With pervasive corruption and minimal accountability to citizenry, "every handling of state resources was grouped around the fellowship to the president. The withdrawal of the state from any kind of service provision culminated in the declaration of the then president Joseph Saidu Momoh in 1988 where he said education is a privilege not a right. While the state was able to raise 15% of GDP in taxes in the period 1974-82, it had fallen to a mere 5% between 1983-91."20
There were two important features to note when discussing decentralization in post-conflict Sierra Leone. First, the state collapsed. In fact, "During the eleven years of war, Sierra Leone became the definition of failed statehood. All public services broke down, protection could not be offered to citizen and 'government' was limited to small fellowships taking power that changed in several times."21 Secondly, young belligerents often perpetuated violence against elders and traditional leaders, thus challenging power structures in local governance.22 These features have importance consequences in the rebuilding of state institutions for post-war Sierra Leone.
A range of actors have become involved in the restructuring of local governance systems in this environment:
Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL)In February 2004, the GoSL "enacted a progressive Local Government Act, establishing 19 local councils, which, over the period of 2004-2008, will take over increasing responsibilities in education, health, agriculture, roads, water and sanitation. Local Council Elections took place in May/June 2004."23
The National Commission for Social Action, is a government-owned Commission funded by the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "Since the inception of decentralisation, NaCSA has been active in providing programmes of high priority for the local councils. These include, among other things, the construction of community centres, markets, schools and health centres for the local councils. NaCSA also recruits and assigns Peace and Development Corps (PADCO) volunteers to the 19 local councils to assist them in preparing their project proposals and access funds."24
An additionally important government institution working in decentralization in Sierra Leone is the Decentralisation Secretariat; it serves "to monitor the decentralisation process and coordinate the necessary capacity-building activities of the local councils and guide them through the principles and policies laid down in the LGA."25 The Secretariat, hosted by the Ministry Rural Development, competes with NaCSA.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)NGOs are particularly engaged in various projects to increase community political participation. One example includes some of the work done by the International Rescue Committee, which "organizes regular forums and meetings where communities can discuss local issues among themselves and with their elected councilors. Communities are working to develop community action plans, thereby receiving hands-on experience in social and political mobilization and organization. Local community groups and elected leaders are also receiving training to build their capacity to engage in national dialogue."26
Multilateral/Bilateral Institutions and International Financial Institutions.Various institutions have been actively involved in implementing, formulating and funding projects to decentralize, as well as related projects that support the efficacy of such an undertaking, including the ADB, Department for International Development (DfID), European Commission (EC), and the World Bank.
These donors also established an agreement with the Government, the: "Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) For Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in Sierra Leone." In this framework, as a priority area for this program, decentralization is made up of three main action points:
1. "Functions and resources to be devolved to local councils as per the Local Government Act 2004 and devolution schedule, as long as financial management and accountability requirements are met.
2. High-level political coordination through quarterly meetings of Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) and follow-up to ensure implementation by line ministries and local councils.
3. Number of local councils meeting the financial management and accountability requirements under the LGA (2004) to be increased annually, in part by hiring qualified finance officers as local council treasurers."27
In addition, the pact focuses other related priorities on anti-corruption, civil service reform, improving service delivery, enhancing dialogue with non-state actors.28
United Nations Development Programme Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project. This program divided decentralization into three sequences from 2004-2008.29
There have been significant critiques of this focus on decentralization, in particular in relation to the role of traditional authorities. Firstly, challenges to traditional authorities during the war had varying implications. Second, how to coordinate roles between chiefdoms and decentralized authorities remains a key consideration for devolving control in Sierra Leone. Both dimensions are not always properly assessed.30
Lessons LearnedIn going forward, various actors have made a number of recommendations. The importance of context is emphasized. It is vital to decentralization in the Sierra Leonean situation not to replicate errors of the past, and to avoid instituting systems according to externally determined structural reform projects. Richard Fanthorpe explains, "'one size fits all' institutional remedies may blind practitioners to the political imperatives that bind the rural poor to non-liberal modes of governance and therefore leave hastily erected 'democratic' institutions vulnerable to political capture by the very forces the project seeks to thwart."31 , UNDP has created a number of support measures, but which may not necessarily break away from the usual blueprint approach that has been criticized. These measures include:
oCentral/local relationships, etc., and
oManpower regimes for local government.
African Development Bank/Department for International Development/European Commission/World Bank. "Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) For Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in Sierra Leone." London: DfID, 2006.
Chiviya, Esau, Dele Olowu and Maria Zwanikken. Capacity Assessment for Public Sector Management and Decentralization Programming Mission. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994.
Edward Sawyer: "Remove or Reform? a Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone," African Affairs 107 (2008): 387-403
Fanthorpe, Richard. "On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone." Africa Affairs 105 no. 418 (2005): 27-49.
Meyer, Stefan. Sierra Leone: Reconstructing a Patrimonial State. Madrid: FRIDE, 2007.
United Nations Development Programme. Sierra Leone Human Development Report 2007: Empowering Local Government for Sustainable Human Development and Poverty Reduction: The District Focus Approach to Development. New York: United Nations, 2007.
The World Bank. Sierra Leone: the Role of the Rapid Results Approach in Decentralization and Strengthening Local Governance. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006).
International Rescue Committee, Programs in Sierra Leone.
Peacebuilding Initiative, Sierra Leone Portal
Sierra Leone Encyclopedia 2008
United Nations Development Programme, Sierra Leone
[Back to Top] 33 Beginning at the onset of independence, Milton Obote took office as Executive Prime Minister. However, tensions over land quickly fractured relationships in government, and in the military. Consequently, in 1971, the commander of the army, Idi Amin, seized power in 1971, which ushered in an oppressive and violent regime. Excluding groups from civil service and military, and exiling rebels polarized Ugandan society, and the Amin regime was also overthrown in 1979, a coup that ultimately returned Obote to power. Rejecting what was perceived as a contentious and rigged election, Yoweri Musevi mobilized a number of armed groups, and declared war on the current regime, eventually culminating in Museveni taking power in 1986.34
Two important outcomes, seemingly contrary to one another, came of this:
(a)Relative stability arrive in most of the regions of Uganda, and lack of political competition through the installation of a 'single-party' state; and,
(b)Power was reoriented in the South, polarizing Northern Acholi populations, and ultimately catalyzing war between Musevenis government and Alice Lakwenas Holy Spirit Movement (and later Joseph Konys Lords Resistance Army).
As a consequence of this duality in Uganda, practitioners have largely split up works. Agencies working on Northern Uganda have focused on humanitarian aid and action taken in the midst of conflict, whereas initiatives at the rest of the country have targeted post-conflict reconstruction and development. As such, Uganda tends to either be discussed as a conflict state, or as a developmental state, with little overlap between these two notions of Uganda.
DecentralizationIn the post-conflict environment that much of the country experienced after 1986, massive reforms were put in place to decentralize the countries, which donors have largely touted as a paradigmatic success story. Populations, tired of years of war through fragmentation in the political apparatus, largely welcomed reforms at decentralization that "wished to avoid competitive politics that would appeal to the population on grounds of ethnicity, religion, or regional particularism."35
Given the legacy of violence in Uganda, the goal of decentralization was largely to enhance the states capacity, as well as to limit calls to fragmentation along ethnic lines, avoiding perpetuating conflict. Decentralization thus aimed to reduce the work load of central authorities, improve local control and ownership over services, allow local managers to make independent, context driven, decisions, and improve accountability through a better system of local monitoring, and to enhance service delivery.36
In order to achieve this, the NRM moved away from chiefly powers, and toward an inclusive system of local governance. This was done by establishing "village-based councils and committees, called resistance councils and committees (RCs). The RC system separated powers which had hitherto been fused in the chief. Legislative power now belonged to a council of all village adults, whereas executive power lay with a committee elected by the village council. The chief was turned into a simple administrative officer, paid, hired and fired like any other member of the civil service except that he was accountable to popular organs. 'The first function of the RC' said the Report of the 1987 Commission of Inquiry into Local Government, 'is that of a "watchdog"': it is to resist any tendency on the part of state officials toward abuse of authority or denial of the rights of the people."37 Concretely, these councils or committees are organized in a hierarchical structure,38 allowing local villages to engage in governance, decisions for which then move up through this hierarchy.39
This process has been significantly successful in many of these endeavors, particularly in improving institutional strength, empowering citizens and encouraging participatory development, improving service delivery, and creating more employment opportunities.40 Decentralization has been instrumental in transitioning the country out of a post-conflict context in much of the country.41 Hence, there is cause for optimism around the potentials decentralization in Uganda.
Yet, this does not mean that Ugandas decentralization process has been without flaws. For instance, some critiques have noted that the excessive demand for, and creation of new districts has led to an unmanageable level of administrative fragmentation.42 This introduces a paradox, in that because some such districts are ineffective, this has to some extent sparked a desire for more district creation, as groups believe that if they were able to have authority over their own districts, they would receive services more efficiently and effectively.43
Also, a number of constraints will continue to impact decentralization in Uganda. Firstly, only now is Northern Uganda brokering peace. This region, having experienced twenty years of on-going violence, will now require implementation of the decentralization process, and incorporating repatriation of masses of refugee and displaced populations into these projects. Some such initiatives are already underway. For instance, USAID has piloted decentralization processes in Gulu and Kamuli, during which, "524 elected, appointed and civil society representatives were trained in the three thematic areas of local governance and leadership, financial management and budgeting, and gender mainstreaming. The same audience was also the target of a separate but connected mentoring effort designed principally to enhance the understanding and applicability of the training in the trainees' workplaces."44 The aim is to replicate this model elsewhere.
A further concern is a return to ethnically based patronage networks in Uganda. While the original goal of Museveni in the original peacebuilding phase was to inhibit ethnically-based patrons from controlling villages, increasingly Museveni has used group identity to continue authoritatively governing the state through controlled patronage networks. Museveni continues to exert strong control over these mechanisms, by presiding over local fiefdoms such as districts, and on this basis has been able to gain access to resources and opportunities for patronage.45 Within these networks, he has "demonstrated a trend towards more exclusionary practices in appointments to public office favoring NRM supporters and his own Bahima and leaving out opposition."46 Such divisive issues were central in Ugandas history of conflict.
Lessons Learned and Questions for the FutureIn areas where decentralization in Uganda has been successful, evidence points to some critical components for success. In Jinja Market for example, decentralization significantly enhanced service delivery, and populations were largely happy with such endeavors.47 However, it is noted that accountability and partnership were critical in this success case.48 In such instances, "...the success of any strategy to privatize/decentralize service provision is contingent however on the following conditions: democratic organizational structures and processes; a clear distribution of duties, obligations and rights under a legitimate framework; the complementarity and compatibility of interests, roles rights and obligations; participation arrangements of all the main stakeholders in decision making and joint sense of ownership of the service, collaborative and amicable partner relationship and orientation of service delivery to the demands of service users."49
Decentralization in Uganda was predicated on the authority of a single-party, preventing competition for rule. Hence, the premise of the local governance system in Uganda, in a sense, had the intention of limiting democracy in a post-conflict environment. Weary of war resulting from fragmentation within the government apparatus, populations largely took to this system, and in many instances it has made the local governance structures much more accountable and participatory. However, some questions still remain, including:
For more information:
Burungi, Harriet, Betty Kwagala, Nansonzi Muwanga, Tobias Onweng and Eirik Jarl Trondsen. "What Makes Markets Tick?" Local Governance and Service Delivery in Uganda Asian Review of Public Administration 7 no. 2 (January-June 2000).
Green, Elliot D. "District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda." Crisis States Research Centre Development as State-Making Working Paper 2 no.24 (January 2008).
Green, Elliott D. "Decentralisation and conflict in Uganda." Conflict, Security & Development 8 no. 4 (December 2008): 425-447.
Hesselbein, Gabi, Frederick Galooba-Mutebi and James Putzel. "Economic and Political Foundations of State Making in Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction." Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper 2 no. 3 (July 2006).
Mamdani, Mahmood. "The Politics of Peasant Ethnic Communities and Urban Civil Society: Reflections on an African Dilemma." In D. Bryceson, C. Kay and J. Mooij (eds.). Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America. London: IT Publications, 2000.
Mwenda, Andrew. Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda. CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 88 (July 2006),
Mugabi, Edward. "Ugandas Decentralisation Policy, Legal Framework, Local Government Structure and Service Delivery." Paper prepared for the First Conference of Regional Assemblies of Africa and Europe organised by the Regional Assembly of Tuscany under the patronage of the Italian Presidency and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Florence, Italy, September 17-18, 2004.
Okidi, John A. and Madina Guloba. "Decentralization and Development: Emerging Issues from Ugandas experience." Kampala, Uganda: Economic Policy Research Centre, September 2006.
Otuno, Ogenga. Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland. ACCORD 2002.
Crisis States Research Centre
Economic Policy Research Centre, Uganda
United States Agency for International Development/Uganda, Success Stories, Decentralization in Uganda (Updated: October 4, 2002).
The World Bank, Uganda
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As a direct result of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States, allied with other international forces and the Northern Alliance, led the UN Security Council sanctioned toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for providing safe haven to Osama Bin Laden. The process for reconstruction of Afghanistan began almost immediately and "in late 2001, a conference in Bonn, Germany, established a process for political reconstruction that ultimately resulted in the adoption of a new constitution and presidential election in 2004. On 9 October 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan. Elections for seats in the new government's legislative body, the National Assembly, were held in September 2005."52
In a sense, Afghanistan is marked by a paradox in terms of governance of the state. Historically, it is a highly centralized state, yet was laden with informally decentralized structures of power, which, "operating in relatively distinct geographic areas, organised loose alliances to gain control of, or resist, the centre. Hierarchies of 'commanders,' so-called warlords, came to dominate large areas, linked in some areas to tribal structures."53 By aligning with these informal leaders, Allied forces and the transitional government have at once legitimized them, and expanded their powers.54 Public administration reform (PAR) is seen as central to rectifying this situation. Reforming the public administration in Afghanistan is a three-tiered initiative, comprised of building an effective civil service, improving local governance and service delivery, and encouraging government accountability to citizenry.55 Perhaps the most glaring challenge to this process is the weak capacity of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC).56 This is largely because the IARCSC has conflicting roles and functions. Two distinctly separate personnel functions are merged within IARCSC: a ministry in charge of personnel, and a traditional Public Service Commission to provide the necessary check and balance between government and employees.57 In addition, there is a serious lack of skilled professionals, for which salaries are costly and high paying appointments for comparable services in the parallel institutions and projects set-up by the international community drives a wedge between 'local' and 'international' staff. Also, the system of patronage works against merit-based recruitment.58 PAR also faces the issue that it may meet with resistance on the basis that it presents a challenge to current structures of power. "PAR is actually a highly political process and the attempted introduction of bureaucratic rule-based systems threatens patronage networks and the control of resources."59 Finally, ongoing tensions and international involvement make reform in this case a particular challenge.
Given the difficulties public administration reform has faced, new approaches are being instituted. Various actors have responded with recommendations in this regard, including enhanced communication and oversight, clear mission, and cohesion with donors so that international activity does not exacerbate tensions.60 Additionally, the World Bank emphasizes that PAR is a long-term task, strong political leadership is vital, appropriate wages should be ensured for better service delivery, IARCSCs function necessitates re-examination, monitoring mechanisms should be put in place, policies for sub-national reform must be clear. The importance of building trust in institutions, providing credible information on government programs, and allowing for participation is emphasized.61 Of course, the continuation of the violent conflict in entire regions of the country continues to constitute a strong obstacle to the reform process.
Lister, Sarah. "Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan." Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper 2 no. 14 (May 2007).
Lister, Sarah. Moving Forward? Assessing Public Administration Reform in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006.
Suhrke, Astri. The Democratisation of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan. Madrid: FRIDE, 2007.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Public Administration Country Profile., New York: UNDESA, 2006.
The World Bank. Afghanistan: Building an Effective State, Priorities for Public Administration Reform. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008.
The World Bank. Project Information Document: Civil Service Reform Project. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007.
Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF)
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Chr. Michelson Institute
IRC, Afghanistan Programs
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan website
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Regime change came to Indonesia in 1998, after over three decades of authoritarian rule under Major-General Suharto.62 Upon the collapse of the repressive Suharto regime, and the end of the 'New Order,' the state was faced with the need to vastly restructure its local governance mechanisms, a process that would entail changing legal frameworks, and working in a cultural environment that for so long had been typified by elite corruption and minority marginalization.63 Under Suharto, elite networks of patrons were controlled through the state apparatus. When Indonesia began its process of democratization in 1999, it was faced with a common problem of peacebuilding democratizationhow to use what little capacity remained to create an accountable government structure.
In the reconstruction period, an emphasis was placed on decentralization and bolstering local governance structures. Two laws were enacted in 1999 to facilitate this process: "Law no. 22 on Local Governance gives full autonomy to the (rural) districts and (urban) municipalities to manage a number of services and duties. including health care, education, public works, arts, and natural resources management and Law no. 25/99 outlines the new fiscal relations between center and regions and provides new formulas for dividing revenues."64 The aim of these laws was to mitigate rent-seeking, to decentralize public services but importantly, also to "save the nation" from the intense political pressures that were put on the central government. Law 22/1999 was revised in 2004 (and become Law 32/2004), further clarifying the roles and responsibilities of central, provincial and local governments.65 Other reforms have expanded and developed the distinguishing criteria and purpose of such regulations, noting: "To ensure the division of power that is proportionally concurrent between the Central Government and the Provincial Region and District/City Administration, a number of criteria must be set that include: externality, accountability, and efficiency in view of the harmonious relationship in running the government affairs among levels of administration."66 In addition, there has been a strong push for public participation in these decentralized forums.
Antlv, Hans. "Civic Engagement in Local Government Renewal in Indonesia." In Citizen Participation in Local Governance: Experiences from Thailand, Indonesia and the Phillippines, 139-171. Learning Initiative on Citizen Participation and Local Governance, Southeast Asia (December 2003).
Antlv, Hans. "Filling the Democratic Deficit: Deliberative Forums and Political Organizing in Indonesia. "In Francis Loh and Joakim jendal .eds. Democracy, Globalization and Decentralization in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge-Curzon Press, 2005.
Bjornlund, Eric, William Liddle, Blair King. Indonesia Democracy and Governance Assessment: Final Report. Bethesda, MD: Democracy International, Inc for USAID, 2008.
Foy, Joseph J. From Civil War to Civil Society: Lessons from the IFES Democratic Development Programs in Deeply Divided Societies. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), 2002.
Republic of Indonesia. Draft Law of the Republic of Indonesia Regarding Regional Administration. The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (Translated into English by the Asian Development Bank Jakarta Office), Law 32, 2004.
Rinaldi, Taufik, Marini Purnomo, and Dewi Damayanti. Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia: Case Studies on Handling Local Government Corruption. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007.
Widianingsih, Ida. "Local Governance, Decentralization, and Participatory Planning in Indonesia: Seeking a New Path to a Harmonious Society." In Raza Ahmad (ed.). The Role of Public Administration in Building Harmonious Society. Selected Proceedings from the Annual Conference of the Network of Asia-Pacific Schools and Institutes of Public Administration and Governance (NAPSIPAG), Beijing, December 5-7, 2005.
Widyanti, Winefrida and Asep Suryahadi. The State of Local Governance and Public Services in Decentralized Indonesia in 2006: Fundings from the Governance and Decentralization Survey 2 (GDS2). Jakarta: The SMERU Research Institute, 2008.
Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS), Indonesia
Decentralization Support Facility,
Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency, Seknas Fitra Indonesia
The Institute for Social Research, Democracy, and Social Justice, Indonesia (Available in Bahasa and English)
International IDEA, Indonesia
LogoLink, Learning Initiative on Citizen Participation and Local Governance
LogoLink Southeast Asia
United Nations Development Programme, Indonesia, Democratic Governance Programme
United States Agency for International Development, Local Governance Support Program,
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In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan gained its independence as a sovereign state.67 However, with its economy dependent on Moscow, the state became difficult to manage. Economic collapse and competition for control of the state, polarized along regional lines, catalyzed civil war in 1992. Though violence was largely quelled by 1993, and peace negotiations commenced in 1994, the final agreement was not signed until June 1997.68 Elections were held in 1999, and the formal agreement was implemented by 2000.69 An issue that has pervaded this case has been the prevalence of corruption in local governance structures. Though this was an issue prior to the war as well, the post-war environment has been challenged to reduce the frequency of such occurrences. "Despite a formal labor code, many public and civil servants continue to be hired through personal networks and political patronage."70 There are significant causes for the continued corruption of public officials and the civil service. Perhaps most crippling is the insufficient wages offered in this arena. UNDP found "that corruption had a tendency to become institutionalized over time, and that low salaries for public servants is one of the most significant root causes."71 Other problems include a lack of regulation on civil service management as well as minimal clarity over civil service responsibilities, all which have led to low morale and quality of the institution. These factors culminate in a situation where corruption is compelling; there is an inability to survive on the meager wages provided, and little understanding of or pride in responsibilities.72 Given the proliferation of corrupt practices in the civil service in Tajikistan, which emerged as a result of economic collapse in the post-Soviet era, reform measures are necessary for the public administration to be at all effective for the general population, though bureaucratic measures are insufficient alone to mitigate these challenges.
Akiner, Shirin and Catherine Barnes. "The Tajik civil war: causes and dynamics." In Abdullaev and Barnes, ed. Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process. Accord 10. London: Conciliation Resources, 2001.
Asian Development Bank. Country Governance Assessment of the Republic of Tajikistan. Asian Development Bank, 2004.
Rondinelli, Dennis A. "Reforming Public Administration in Postconflict Societies: Implications for International Assistance." The Mitchell Group, Inc. for the United States Agency for International Development, PN-ADG-326, January 2006.
Rubin, Barnett. "Introduction to the Tajikistan Peace Agreement." EurasiaNet, 1998.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Republic of Tajikistan: Public Administration Country Profile. New York: UNDESA, 2004.
The World Bank. Projects financed by the Small Grants Program in Tajikistan in 2007.
Abdullaev, Kamoludin and Catherin Barnes. Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan peace process. ACCORD Tajikistan, March 2001.
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1. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Democratic Republic of the Congo: Public Administration Country Profile (New York: United Nations, 2007), 3-4.
3. Denis Tull, "A reconfiguration of political order? The state of the state in North Kivu" (DR Congo), African Affairs 102 (2003), 424.
4. UNDESA, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 3-4.
5. International Crisis Group (ICG), Congo: Consolidating the Peace (Brussels: ICG, 2007), 5.
6. William Reno, "Congo: from state collapse to absolutism, to state failure," Third World Quarterly 27 no. 1 (2006), 44.
7. Stephen Jackson, "Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War Economy," Review of African Political Economy 93/94 (2002), 522.
8. IGC, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, i.
9. Michael Brown, "A Hands on Model for Combating Corruption in Contexts of Extreme Poverty: Lessons from the Congo and Potential for Replicability in Africa and Beyond," Innovative Respources Management, 4.
10. UNDESA, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 9.
11. IGC, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, 18.
12. UNDESA, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12.
13. World Bank/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Kinshasa: World Bank 2002), 6.
14. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "UNDP to sign $390 million governance programme with DRC," UNDP Newsroom, January 25, 2008.
15. Brown, "A Hands on Model for Combating Corruption in Contexts of Extreme Poverty."
16. Muzong W Kodi, Anti-Corruption Challenges in Post-Election Democratic Republic of Congo, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2007), 14.
17. IGC, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, 18.
18. Kodi, Anti-Corruption Challenges in Post-Election Democratic Republic of Congo, 10.
19. Brown, "A Hands on Model for Combating Corruption in Contexts of Extreme Poverty," 12.
20. Stefan Meyer, "Sierra Leone: Reconstructing a Patrimonial State," FRIDE Development In Perspective Case Studies (2007), 3.
21. Ibid., 4.
22. Ibid., 6.
23.World Bank, "Sierra Leone: the Role of the Rapid Results Approach in Decentralization and Strengthening Local Governance," World Bank Findings: Poverty Reduction, Economic Management and Social Policy 261 (2006), 1.
24. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Sierra Leone Human Development Report 2007: Empowering Local Government for Sustainable Human Development and Poverty Reduction: The District Focus Approach to Development," UNDP (Sierra Leone, 2007), 72.
26. International Rescue Committee, Programs in Sierra Leone.
27. African Development Bank/Department for International Development/European Commission/World Bank, "Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) For Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in Sierra Leone," DfID, July 18, 2006, 4.
28. Ibid., 3-4.
29. UNDP, "Sierra Leone Human Development Report 2007," 54.
30. Ibid., 36.
31. Richard Fanthorpe, "On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone," Africa Affairs 105, No. 418 (2005), 45.
32. Chiviya, Esau, Dele Olowu and Maria Zwanikken, "Capacity Assessment for Public Sector Management and Decentralization Programming Mission," United Nations Development Programme Management Development and Governance Division, Sierra Leone: Aide Memoire, December 5-23, 1994.
33. Leonce Ndikumana and Justine Nannyonjo, "From failed State to Good Performer? The Case of Uganda," (In James K. Boyce and Madalene ODonnell eds. 15-54. Peace and the Public Purse, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).
34. Otuno, Ogenga, "Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland," ACCORD 2002.
35. Gabi Hesselbein, Frederick Galooba-Mutebi and James Putzel, Economic and Political Foundations of State Making in Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction (London: Crisis States Research Centre,2006), 17.
36. Harriet Burungi et al., "What Makes Markets Tick? Local Governance and Service Delivery in Uganda," Asian Review of Public Administration 7 no. 2 (2000), 32.
37. Mahmood Mamdani, "The Politics of Peasant Ethnic Communities and Urban Civil Society: Reflections on an African Dilemma," (In D. Bryceson, C. Kay and J. Mooij eds., Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America, London: IT Publications, 2000), 109.
38. Burungi et al., "What Makes Markets Tick?," 32.
39. Hesselbein, Galooba-Mutebi and Putzel, "Economic and Political Foundations of State Making in Africa," 17-18.
40. John A. Okidi and Madina Guloba, Decentralization and Development: Emerging Issues from Ugandas experience (Kampala, Uganda: Economic Policy Research Centre, 2006), 4-5.
41. Edward Mugabi, "Ugandas Decentralisation Policy, Legal Framework, Local Government Structure and Service Delivery," (Paper prepared for the First Conference of Regional Assemblies of Africa and Europe organised by the Regional Assembly of Tuscany under the patronage of the Italian Presidency and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Florence, Italy, September 17-18, 2004), 8.
42. Okidi and Guloba, Decentralization and Development: Emerging Issues from Ugandas experience.
43. Communications with John. A. Okidi, by email, May 22, 2008.
44. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Uganda, Success Stories, Decentralization in Uganda.
45. Elliott D. Green, "Decentralisation and conflict in Uganda," Conflict, Security & Development 8 no. 4 (December 2008): 425-447.
46. Hesselbein, Galooba-Mutebi and Putzel, "Economic and Political Foundations of State Making in Africa," 18.
47. Burungi et al., "What Makes Markets Tick?," 36-37.
48. Ibid., 43-44.
49. Ibid., 47-48.
50. Communications with John. A. Okidi, by email, May 22, 2008.
51. Andrew Mwenda, "Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda," CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 88 (2006).
52. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Public Administration Country Profile (New York: United Nations, 2006), 2-3.
53. Sarah Lister, Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2007), 3.
54. Ibid., 3-4.
55. World Bank, Afghanistan: Building an Effective State, Priorities for Public Administration Reform (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), iii-iv.
56. Lister, Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan, 2.
57. The World Bank, Afghanistan: Building an Effective State, Priorities for Public Administration Reform.
58. Lister, Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan, 3-4.
59. Ibid., 7.
60. Ibid., 15-17.
61. World Bank, Afghanistan: Building an Effective State, Priorities for Public Administration Reform, xii- xvii.
62. Joseph J. Foy, From Civil War to Civil Society: Lessons from the IFES Democratic Development Programs in Deeply Divided Societies (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), 2002), 73.
63. Hans Antlov, "Civic Engagement in Local Government Renewal in Indonesia," (In Citizen Participation in Local Governance: Experiences from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, 139-171. Learning Initiative on Citizen Participation and Local Governance, Southeast Asia2003), 143.
64. Ibid., 144.
65. Communications with Hans Antlov, by email, August 11, 2008.
66. Republic of Indonesia, Draft Law of the Republic of Indonesia Regarding Regional Administration, The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (Translated into English by the Asian Development Bank Jakarta Office), Law 32, 2004, 72.
67. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Country Governance Assessment of the Republic of Tajikistan (Manila: ADB, 2004), 1.
68. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Conflict history: Tajikistan," ICG.
69. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Republic of Tajikistan: Public Administration Country Profile. (New York: United Nations, 2004), 2.
70. Dennis A. Rondinelli, Reforming Public Administration in Postconflict Societies: Implications for International Assistance (Bethesda, MD: The Mitchell Group, Inc. for the United States Agency for International Development, 2006), 13.
71. United Nations Development Programme, Public administration reform and anti-corruption in Europe & CIS, Corruption halting reforms in Tajikistan: UNDP survey.
72. ADB, Country Governance Assessment of the Republic of Tajikistan, 4.