Introduction: Economic Recovery Strategies: Key Debates & Implementation Challenges
While there are many relevant debates and challenges, this section highlights a few that broadly underlie issues of economic recovery and explicitly or implicitly inform policy and programming choices. The section is not intended to be comprehensive, and debates linked to conceptual and practical issues can be found throughout the section. For example, the reliefdevelopment debate is discussed in the definitions section. In other thematic sub-sections, institutional and ideological debates and challenges are explored from a thematic perspective. The following provides a sampling of these issues.
More contentious are the debates surrounding the role of development and economic policy in creating and/or exacerbating conflict, which is more the focus of this section.
The notion that the state of human welfare and/or development is a key source of conflict had a revival in the 1990s after a decade or more of considerable focus on identity- or ethnicity-related conflict. International political economy scholars repopularized attention on economic causes of war, as did emerging discourses around "war economies," although in reality many scholars from the global South, Africans in particular, have maintained the fundamental development dimensions of conflict.1 At the heart of these was Paul Collier's "greed versus grievance" theory, which gained notoriety by highlighting the economic incentives of rebel groups rather than legitimate grievances.2 Collier describes these entrepreneurs of violence as actively adopting the occupation of warfare as a means of profitable commerce,3 which is an extension of the Clausewitzian analogy of wars as a "continuation of politics by other means" (in this case, a continuation of commerce by other means).
There are many critics of the "greed" theory of war, many of whom suggest that it is simplistic in its focus on the perpetrator and in not taking into account broader societal needs. David Keen argues that the political context of a "war on terror" can align a "rebel greed or grievance" agenda with anti-terror strategies.4 Mark Duffield similarly warns that by believing these perpetrators can be neutralized or removed from power, "liberal peace, in alliance with the poor, can once again resume normal development."5
More Marxist interpretations view conflict as the inevitable result of resource-dependent "capitalist expansion."6 Patrick Bond names capitalist tendencies of material accumulation and the requisite exploitation of resources needed to sustain a drive toward physical wealth as the primary cause of conflict. By contrast, the neoliberal view holds that developing economies need access to global markets to break the poverty-conflict trap. By investing in local economies, improving regulatory mechanisms, strengthening rule of law, and carefully monitoring (and certifying) natural resource extraction and commerce, development actors can decouple the relationship sufficiently for economic prosperity and social equality to begin to become possible.
Many scholars and practitioners have been in agreement that poverty is positively correlated to a risk of conflict and that ongoing conflict can perpetuate social and economic inequalities. Evidence and long-term trends suggest that conflict can stunt or reverse development and that poverty increases conflict vulnerability. Some recent studies illustrate, however, either that conflict has had no impact on development or, in certain cases, that it actually may have had a positive impact.
A recent study on conflict in Africa (1980-2005) builds on this research to examine the role of socio-economic risk factors in conflict. The results reaffirm that while structural risk factors played a role in perpetuating conflict, the relationship is neither "automatic or uniform, and their presence should not be considered predictive but rather as relevant risk factors requiring attention."7 Other findings included:
The role of economic policy is contested as both a driver of conflict and a cornerstone of conflict prevention. As Fukuda-Parr and colleagues note, "Development policy can either alleviate or worsen group grievance, the youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and poor governance of natural resources; it can then help reduce or exacerbate the risks of armed conflict recurring."12 Krishna Kumar underscores macroeconomic stability as the most important element of any economic rehabilitation endeavor. He writes, "Almost all recent postconflict governments had followed flawed economic policies prior to wars," arguing that these conditions grew worse during the conflict and exacerbated domestic poverty. He affirms, "Macroeconomic stability is essential not only to facilitate economic recovery but also to lay the foundation for sustainable economic growth."13
Others suggest that development policies have achieved the opposite of their intention by allowing conflict risk factors to reemerge or strengthen. Differing ideologies and policy prescriptions vie to explain the complex relationship between economic and development approaches and the various structural and incidental causes of conflict. Development literature has underscored the role of economic growth in laying sustained foundations for peace, yet international development policies have often undermined human development in recipient states and exacerbated the underlying causes of conflict by failing to address root causes or by prioritizing state economic growth over human development. The result is a widened gap between rich and poor.14 It is precisely this link that demands development policy be rooted in a peacebuilding framework, as it is a "matter of deep concern to all development actors."15
Since the Second World War, developing countries have been particularly affected by civil unrest.16 Notably, violent conflicts are concentrated in the countries that are farthest behind in achieving the MDGs.17As steward of the MDGs, UNDP acknowledges the destabilizing effects of social and economic change, gearing its development and conflict-prevention strategies to address "exclusion, inequality, burden-sharing and displacement and their impact on conflict."18 Thus, despite varied positions on the exact nature of the relationship, many agree that one does exist. This reality underscores the need for conflict-sensitive development programming and, specifically, economic recovery in cases where countries and communities are emerging from conflict and crisis.
Taxonomy of International Response to the Conflict-Development Nexus
Rhetorical repackaging/development axiomatically reduced conflict
There is an assumption that development by definition promotes peace; thus, no changes in development in practice are required, only more of it. However, some studies debunk this assumption, and there is growing criticism of strategies that are based on the belief that development prevents violence and ensures peace.
Donors withdraw aid to punish recipients for their excessive military expenditure or military aggression. The International Monetary Fund, with the support of Germany and Japan, initiated the move in this direction in the early 1990s to reduce military spending. This was an important shift.
The post-conflict agenda
Since the mid-1990s, aid agencies have implemented programs for promoting peace through specific areas, including justice and reconciliation, demobilization and reintegration, and democratic policing. This agenda assumes that development work will return to normal once peace has been established.
Assessing post-conflict dynamics and the do no harm approach
The do no harm approach, based on research by Mary Anderson, aims to minimize the negative impact of all humanitarian and development assistance under conditions of conflict. However, this is difficult where there is a lack of reliable and accurate information about the post-conflict situation. Additionally, actors motivations may have either positive or negative effects on the environment.
The conflict prevention agenda
In the late 1990s, the international community took the post-conflict agenda one step further to conflict prevention, whereby agencies undertake a range of early and preferably coherent and coordinated actions to prevent conflict from turning violent. Many of the implementation strategies for the conflict prevention agenda are similar to the post-conflict agenda. Conflict prevention and early warning systems are hotly contested issues.
The concept of human security
Human security, which builds on the concepts of human needs and human development, emerged in the late 1990s as a way to capture the nexus between conflict and development. According to human security theory, "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" are inseparable sides of the same coin. The theory is also strongly connected to social change theory.
The "global system reform" movement
This movement infuses concerns with the development and conflict nexus in all North-South relations of trade, investment, and consumption. This idea implies a more global conceptualization of conflict and development, as opposed to viewing these issues as a problem of the Third World only.
Source: Uvin, Peter. The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 1, no. 1 (2002): 1.
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At the heart of the debate lies the fact that aid dispensed by international financial institutions (IFIs) has been dependent on the adoption of economic and political liberalization measures whose effects upon the goals of sustainable peace and development have been deeply questioned.19 This has led to new approaches aimed at more gradual liberalization, in recognition of failed Washington Consensus policies that prioritize the imposition of rapid global market integration over institutional readiness (highlighted in greater detail in the public finance section) and strategies for longer-term peacebuilding, without due consideration to the pacing or sequencing of reforms. This theme reemerges throughout the research and bodes stark warning for economic policy makers in this arena.
The severe capacity constraints of domestic financial institutions and their regulatory capabilities has pressed the case for capacity development as an essential post-conflict priority in all spheres--especially accompanying economic recovery-related activities--a change now increasingly visible in many financial institutions post-conflict economic liberalization initiatives. Progress made through renewed efforts by the World Bank in Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) to pivot on this agenda are encouraging, but if these processes omit core peacebuilding principles, gains will be limited.
While debates around liberalization approaches remain vigorous, there is a strong and growing consensus that strong institutions (especially financial) based on good governance models are central to a broader development agenda.20 Some go farther, proposing that economic liberalization initiatives pursued through conflict-sensitive, nationally owned, and participatory processes phased appropriately to address risk factors and local governance issues have been shown to be the most successful.21 While such efforts can be identified in some cases, notably through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and poverty reduction strategies paper (PRSP) process in Liberia,22 this is by no means the norm in practice. In attempting to replicate successes, a range of critics point to the need for policy makers to take into account broader debates about the impact of economic recovery strategies and the prioritization of the phasing of these activities, and to gain a more nuanced understanding of the human development paradigm and its implications for prevailing policy.
Economic recovery fundamentally rests upon assumptions and theories of development and economics, and for this reason time is taken to unpack key debates that underpin policy and programming in these areas. The following inter-related and progressive set of debates seeks to illustrate the complex role that liberalization plays in peacebuilding. First is a discussion of the "liberal peace thesis" and its lasting impact on economic and development policies. Next, the "institutionalization before liberalization" debate is examined, which seeks to address prioritization of activities in post-conflict states. Finally, a discussion of the emergence of the human development paradigm is offered, which presents a challenge for the dominant economic growth orthodoxy in post-conflict economic recovery and peacebuilding settings.
Debate: The liberal peace thesis and its lasting impactThe global push toward market liberalization emerges from the widely held liberal peace thesis that democratic and free market governments are more peaceful than other forms of government. While the thesis guides the diplomacy and decision making of governments globally, but particularly in the North, it has many critics. Critics argue the approach is laden with inherent contradictions, misses the specific socio-economic challenges of post-conflict countries, and exacerbates social and economic inequalities through marginalization and increased vulnerability to poverty.
Early roots of liberal peace and the "end of history"
The liberal peace thesis is based on the assumption that democratic governance models are inherently more peaceful than other political systems.23 The ideology was propelled through post-First World War Wilsonian foreign policy principles that elevated the American model of capitalist democracy as a desirable ideal whose export would foment the promotion of peace abroad. President Woodrow Wilson promoted the platform at the Versailles peace conference as a new world vision dedicated to freedoms enshrined by constitutions to protect minority rights, encourage free trade, engage public debate on world affairs, and promote human self-determination. His recommendation, based on the enlightenment philosophies of John Locke and Adam Smith, created the League of Nations, which was the first international body of its kind. This marked a significant historical change and the birth of the modern liberal peace thesis.24
The liberal peace thesis was reinvigorated following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, when Francis Fukuyama triumphantly launched his controversial "end of history" thesis, arguing that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies (specifically liberalism and Marxism) was largely over. Liberal democracies (involving both political and economic liberalism), he argued, would be the "final form of human government" and could not be improved on.25 Fukuyama was a key Reagan Administration contributor to the formulation of the Reagan Doctrine, and thus an important figure in the rise of neoconservativism. This thinking was to influence directly the international peacebuilding agenda. Roland Paris' examination of peace operations through the 1990s is illustrative, revealing these Wilsonian roots, anchored in the belief that the export of democratization and the liberalization of capital markets would inherently foster peace in post-war countries.26 This is discussed in more detail below.
Debate: Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and their effectsIn economic policy, such neoconservative views laid a foundation for the development of the so-called Washington Consensus, the trend by international financial institutions (IFIs) and donors to make financial assistance conditional on market liberalization policies, with the aim of privatization and deregulation opening the best prospects for sustained economic growth.27 This thinking has generally underpinned the IFI-led dominant growth-led economic approaches of growth and related policy making and programming. The stabilization stimulus packages stipulated by IFIs in the 1980s contained structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that focused on "macroeconomic stabalisation, public sector reform and the liberalization of markets and trade."28 These policies were of particular significance to African countries in the 1980s and 1990s, pledging "accelerated development" and an end to Africa's marginalization from globalization through incentivization of foreign direct investment and expansion and diversification of exports.29
A two-pronged strategy of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment was created by IFIs. This begins with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality program and credits drawn on a country's special drawing rights (SDRs) at the IMF in support of stabilization based on orthodox deflationary principles of monetary and fiscal restraint. As described by Susan Woodward, "The IMF determines the conditions for foreign confidence in a country's economic prospects and places priority on macroeconomic stability, both as the first task of economic policy and as the context within which all other aid and policy takes place."30
The debate over the effects of SAPs on the recipient states have centered on the influence of these programs on economic growth rates and the social effects of adjustment or the impact on poverty levels, distributional inequalities, and vulnerable sectors of the recipient country population.31
Evidence of SAPs' success is weak, though the issue remains contested. Many critics claim that in two decades of implementing SAP policies, no compelling indicators exist to support claims that they promote economic growth, which is their primary aim. Additionally, there is no compelling evidence of their contributing to poverty reduction or distributional inequality. Instead, the evidence suggests that they have had the opposite effect. Moreover, the policies are believed to be too rigid to adapt to the unique needs of each country and lacking in the participation of the populations they affect most directly.32
Following two decades of SAPs across Africa, strong critiques have emerged. Former UN Special Rapporteur on Structural Adjustment and Debt Fantu Cheru states that the SAP process "resulted in the adoption of one-size-fits-all economic policies, which were often poorly adapted to a country's specific needs, which lacked broad popular support, and which failed to make poverty reduction a priority."33 African scholars began to observe that while "Western-style democracy stood as a goal of the political and public domain, the growth models relying on private ownership and pursuit of macroeconomic variables operated in a highly undemocratic manner, privileging the interests of those engaged in export and international trade. Such priorities often came at the expense of civil and political liberties and self-government, while fuelling intense social and economic inequality and violent conflict."34
Other critics hold that Washington Consensus-driven SAPs dangerously stipulate extreme government spending cuts and prematurely push privatization before the regulatory environment matures. Further, critics hold SAPs leave nascent economies vulnerable to exploitative foreign investment, often deepening conditions of poverty. In Africa and Latin America, where these policies were most prevalent, per capita income was shown either to dive or to languish, respectively.35 In the 1980s, when these policies were widely mandated in the developing world, their introduction exacerbated tensions over land and natural resource control, while government control of profitable agri-business heightened rural grievances.36
The IMF has sought to defend itself against a number of critiques, acknowledging that the 1980s and early 1990s were an exceptionally difficult period for low-income developing countries, particularly in Africa. Ultimately, it attributes failures to financial mismanagement and adverse shocks, which culminated in the debt crisis of the 1980s, rather than to problematic policy design. In particular, the IMF argues that there was a marked turnaround in growth performance in enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) countries between the early 1980s (prior to the ESAFs creation) and the mid-1990s. From a period of declining per capita incomes in the early 1980s, real per capita growth in ESAF program countries caught up with that in other developing countries by the mid-1990s and was continuing to strengthen.
The IMF also argues that about half of the improvement in ESAF program countries' growth performance could be attributed to strengthened macroeconomic and structural policies. This finding is in line with a wide body of academic research on the causes of growth, which confirms that the kind of policies the ESAF supports--prudent macroeconomic policies, freer and more open markets, and a stable and predictable environment for private sector activity--are growth enhancing.37
In the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature, the critiques focus on how orthodox economic liberalization policies fail to address the realities of post-conflict needs, capacities, and economic environments. They offer that macroeconomic policies are inappropriate for post-conflict countries in deep transition and are better suited to stable economies. Some recommend that more attention be paid to measuring compensation programs based on accountability and rational policy.38 The claim is that the austerity measures imposed by such programs attach social costs if poverty alleviation measures are not instituted. Moreover, institutional financial constraints should first measure the country's capacity to absorb the short-term negative consequences, before implementation.39
The stabilization model has also been criticized for not addressing the goals of social peace and reconciliation, which are critical aspects of ensuring sustainable peace. It has been noted that "the tension has organizational and strategic aspects as well, between representatives of the IFIs and their role in financing reconstruction, on the on one hand, and the representatives of the peace mission (most often the UN) and its mandate to implement the peace agreement, on the other."40
While the shift to PRSPs reflects some recognition of these policy design flaws on the part of international organizations and IFIs, application of new thinking is inconsistent between agencies, interventions, and states, and the debate continues over how and in which sequence new measures are implemented, and their real implications for human development.
The liberal approach of UN peace missions and the lessons: Institutionalization before liberalizationCapturing the essence of many critiques highlighting the pitfalls of liberalization, Roland Paris puts forward the thesis that the international community's dominant approach to peacebuilding in the 1990s was flawed on the basis that the dominant liberal peace thesis is not sensitive to the reality of government capacities after a conflict. Rapid liberalization and marketization can, in fact, create conditions for a return to conflict. Paris notes, "These arguments tend to gloss over an important distinction: Although well-established market democracies may be more peaceful in their internal and international affairs than non-democracies, the policy of promoting democracy necessarily involves transforming a state into a market democracy. . . . These debates have largely skirted the relationship between liberalization and conflict."41 Liberal peace literature generally assumes "the existence of functioning states as a given . . . but this methodology offers few insights into the challenges of peacebuilding, because war-shattered states typically lack even the most rudimentary governmental institutions."42
Paris argues that marketization is not a magic cure. The process of political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous, and it can exacerbate conflict and undermine prospects for stable peace in fragile conditions. Assessing 14 peace operation missions, Paris study found that, in most cases, the approach failed to produce sustained peace, and even undermined it. He attributes the failure to flawed assumptionsthat economic growth would lead naturally to liberal capitalist economies and stable polities resembling western democraciesand methods, rather than goals.43 He works to expose the "weaknesses of the nave version of Wilsonianism that informed the missions of the 1990s" and to suggest "methods of achieving the Wilsonian goal without endangering the very peace that the liberalization process is supposed to consolidate."44
The alternative Paris suggests, which is generally supported by the literature on statebuilding, is that of "institutionalization before liberalization," which involves constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions and then taking gradual steps to build democracies and market economies. This approach assumes that liberalization is an inherently tumultuous and conflict-inducing process that is capable of undermining a fragile peace. In seeks, in the short run, to minimize destabilization, and, in the long run, to promote liberal market democracies.45
More specifically, it could involve delaying reforms until political conditions are less fragile, drawing out reforms over a longer period of time, and generally ensuring that sound legal and governance frameworks are in place before economic reforms are implemented.46 Other suggestions for reforms that can alleviate societal stress from liberalization are:
Many scholars now reinforce the state's role as a critical component of peacebuilding. While the prevailing wisdom in the late 20th century was that the state is the problem, today the state is seen as the solution. This implies a change in thinking from downsizing to strengthening the state.50 At the same time, scholars have outlined how peacebuilding is not synonymous with statebuilding. Tensions exist between them that "require contextualized judgments about sequencing and prioritization. . . . Despite these tensions state institutions play an important part in consolidating peace."51 Also, external statebuilding can have an oppositional effect by weakening states.
As Charles Call argues, even if one agrees that liberal goods, including greater participation, rights of free speech and association, and unfettered media, strengthen a population's sense of representation and ownership of the state, "external support for these goods may itself undermine the legitimacy of the intended beneficiary state or elites."52 The management of two sets of tensions is crucial for creating a sustainable state while keeping peace on track: (1) between external interests and internal legitimation processes, and (2) between enhancing state legitimacy and supporting political pacts that lie outside (but include) the state.53
Efforts are underway by various scholars to try to ensure that statebuilding and peacebuilding "contradictions" can be mediated to serve peace, although the economic recovery dimension is likely to require more focused attention.54
[Back to Top] 55 Specifically, it measured the increased value of goods and services in an economy as measured by gross domestic product. As a result, human welfare has been treated as an incidental "by-product" of economic growth rather than as its objective.56
Go to Definitions: Human development index; Human development; GDP
Perhaps the strongest challenge over the years to the economic growth model has been put forward by the United Nations Development Programme. UNDP suggested the human development model, which focuses on broader linkages between social and economic development. Human development places humans (rather than markets) at the center of the development project. Thus, it consciously links economic, fiscal, trade, energy, agricultural, industrial, and all other types of policy to what is most economically, socially, and ecologically beneficial to meeting people's needs in a sustainable way. Human development was conceived by economist Mahbud ul Haq and institutionalized and developed within the UNDP in the early 1990s. It shares much with earlier development alternatives put forward by African heads of state since the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), and was reaffirmed in the African Alternative Framework to SAPs for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (1991).
Economic growthThe implications of adopting this new model become apparent in its challenge of orthodox notions of development. These prioritize a modernized state idealized in global governance models and made popular by the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus in the last two decades of the 20th century.57 According to this paradigm, economic growth was widely held as the solution to poverty. It was meant to correct deficiencies in health, education, food security, and nutrition, as well as improve access to basic services.58 As discussed in the previous section, structural adjustment was a programmatic realization and extension of this ideology, intended to spur economic growth by removing obstacles to a thriving free capitalism-oriented market.59 This approach employed gross domestic product and gross national product to gauge national income, as primary indicators of economic growth objectives.60 These measures divided the world into "developed" and "underdeveloped," despite contrasting poverty rates or a population's access to basic services.61
Advocates of the neoliberal model claim that growth is the driver for development. Positive national growth rates offer the best prospects for fortifying personal economic security.62 Despite detrimental effects for the environment, human rights, and some social indicators in underdeveloped countries, it was seen as the only path to poverty alleviation and access to basic services, even for marginalized, vulnerable populations in developed states.63
Critics claim that growth is necessary but insufficient to ensure genuine, or human, development. As a measure of progress, income is viewed as anemic, unable to capture all the fundamental aspects of individual quality of life. These critics hold that underlying presumptions are wrong: no natural connection exists between wage levels and social welfare. Indeed, this link must be carefully constructed through targeted "pro-poor" public policy, prioritization of social services, and wealth redistribution measures.Growth does not always benefit the poor;64 it may be unevenly distributed, as it often may not "trickle down" to the poorest of society.65 Policies must purposefully transform economic growth into meaningful improvements in peoples daily lives or risk exacerbating income inequality and youth exclusion.66 While economic growth is a necessary condition for this shift, it cannot be measured solely by some quantifiable increase; rather, it must more importantly reflect the quality of this progress.67
Other critics argue that the growth model does not adequately consider context, including conflict and post-conflict settings, in which conditions and priorities that ensure economic recovery are different. The consequences of armed conflict on development vary substantially in each context. Populations and economies may be unevenly affected, experiencing growth in certain sectors while conflict remains.68 A telling example of this phenomenon is Rwandas significant growth in the past 10 years, despite only minimal gains in poverty alleviation and Millennium Development Goals. By employing the human development approach of UNDP, inextricable connections are made between progress in social welfare and economic progress. According to the Rwandan government, "As we examine the future development path for Rwanda, it is vitally important that we move beyond merely examining long-term sources of growth and look towards promoting broad-based sustainable human development for all."69
Human developmentThe notion of human development emerged in the early 1990s as a new paradigm that attempted to capture the indicators classic economic development models excluded.70 It was promoted by Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya Sen, and Paul Streeten as a way to expand the measures of income to include the breadth of human welfare choices, economic, social, and political.71 It binds the results of growth with the associated equitable distribution of benefits of that growth, both fundamental to true human progress. It offers a multi-faceted approach to development that highlights personal freedoms and rights, social equality, access to livelihoods, and social engagement.72 It is premised on principles of democratic governance, peace, and personal security.73
The model was meant to address gaps and identify a way to capture the role of human capital as a fundamental component of growth, particularly in knowledge assets and their capacity to influence key sectors of the economy.74 As this approach gained traction among economists and researchers, a mutual dependency became clear. A broad endorsement held that the well-being of society relied on economic growth, and boosts in national income meant access to better livelihoods and, thus, quality of life. However, these measures of progress alone were insufficient if their gains were not carefully stewarded and distributed throughout society.75
Thus, the human development paradigm embraces all of society, not just the economy. The political, cultural, and social factors are given as much attention as the economic factors.76 Economic progress is insignificant without greater civil participation, gender and minority equality, and improved citizens' rights. For example, national income gains used for military expenditure and elite benefit rather than housing provisions, food security, or increased access to healthcare are devoid of any positive impact on a state's population.77 Furthermore, the human development model captures a conflict-sensitive approach, linking human development to security.78
Detractors of the human development model feel it is incongruent with macroeconomic policies promoted by IFIs.79 Others suggest it is just an expanded idea of growth that bares no significant difference in practice. In criticizing the Human Development Report, they claim that economic growth is not the means to the end of human development but rather that they are simultaneous ambitions. Large external donors typically prioritized major investments to infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, and ports), intending these to facilitate the foreign direct investment necessary to boost private sector activity and create jobs, while also providing access to markets and services. However, development experts cite a failure to invest in education, health, and nutrition or other basic services.80 These critics claim that institutions often carry only the pretense of development priorities when economic growth goals are evident.81 Others suggest that there are mechanical problems with trying to weigh equally various growth indexes, such as the inclusion of quantified intangible dimensions of human development like crime rates, pollution, and quality housing.82 Go to Private Sector
Human development theorists critique the human development index (HDI) concept themselves, in particular for its inability to capture the whole of the human development concept, notably the importance of political freedom and participation.83 Some have noted that it is less tractable than gross domestic product (GDP) as a result of its multidimensionality, and that the education variable does not take into account the quality of education, which, they argue, is declining at all levels in Africa. For these reasons, some are arguing the need to find a measure that corrects GDP for differences in income distribution.84
At the same time, there is little dispute that the HDI is a richer measure than GDP, and that human development on the whole offers a potent alternative to narrow measures and conceptions of progress and human welfare. Many agree that, ultimately, this is more congruent with the requirements for establishing the foundations of a durable peace.
Efforts to conceptualize "broad-based" and "inclusive" economic recovery are importantly making headway among scholars and practitioners. Development and other actors are trying to elaborate what might be considered a middle path between growth and human development concerns. At the same time, challenges remain, particularly in the making of appropriate sequencing and prioritization choices that spur conflict-sensitive economic recovery, which ultimately is dependent on numerous local and international contextual factors.
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Fifteen years ago, the dominant assumption among academics and many development policy advisers was that macroeconomic policy making and, indeed, many areas of revenue and expenditure management were not open to inclusive decision making. As noted by scholar Deborah Brautigam, the thinking was that this area "needed to be somewhat exclusionary in order to allow technical considerations, and not 'politics' to dominate."85 Yet, while the power of participation in actually achieving different ends when it comes to development policy is not proved, it is nonetheless increasingly valued by the international community, at least in theory.Brautigam notes, "Participation is a central element of democracy, and increasingly, citizen participation in economic policy is advocated as a way to make government spending more 'pro-poor.'"86
Quality participation therefore involves a two-way relationship: the type and level of participation, which also involves the capacity of the participants, and the genuineness and commitment of the actor granting that participation, specifically that actors readiness and political will to accept the content of participant views.
Forms of participation
Information Sharing: A minimum requirement for a participatory process. For example, at this point in the PRSP process, stakeholders are briefed about the PRSP, its purpose is explained, and the process is planned.
Consultation: When public views are solicited. Government is not under any obligation to include such views in the final outcome.
Joint decision making: Where participants are allowed to debate and agree on the content of the policy formulation process.
Initiation and control by stakeholders: The most advanced form of participation.
Source: McGee, Rosemary, with Andrew Norton. Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies: A Synthesis of Experience with Participatory Approaches to Policy Design, Implementation and Monitoring. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2000
Participatory budgeting (PB)PB started as an experimental project in Brazil and has rapidly gained popularity in the global South, with encouragement from the international community.88 Participatory budgeting, at its most basic, refers to "turning over budgetary decisions to the citizens impacted by the budget."89 It aims to enable ordinary people to make policy decisions about the allocation of public resources.90 Participants make choices on the prioritization of public investment areas, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development, as well as conduct monitoring and evaluations of government finance activities.91 PB is accomplished through forums at the local level that are held over an annual period.92 Brian Wampler notes, however, "It is important to keep in mind that there is no precise or exact model for PB programs. While there are similar tenets and institutional mechanisms, PB programs are structured in response to the particular political, social, and economic environment of each city or state."93 This is key in ensuring that PB processes are tailored to the particular contexts of the situation, which may be especially different in post-conflict countries. Go to Public Finance
The benefits of PB, as argued by some scholars and practitioners, are more equitably distributed public expenditures, higher quality of life, increased satisfaction of basic needs, greater transparency in public finance, increased inclusion of the needs of marginalized populations, and increased capacity of ordinary citizens.94 A secondary benefit is that through negotiation and communication, participants learn how to cooperate with one another, which may be particularly beneficial to reconciliation following conflict.In addition, "it is increasingly recognized that participatory budgeting is not only an effective mechanism to improve targeting of public resources to the poor, but also a new agenda in decentralization and social accountability."95 Alejandro Bendana argues for the advancement "toward 'non-reformist reform' coalitions that can push state power to implement real development policies that are justice based. Support for and participation of movements that will struggle for solidarity economies, for national democratic governance and for changes in financial and economic policies, structures and systems that can allow alternatives to be built."96
Not all support participatory budgeting, however. Anwar Shah posits, "Governments in developing countries may argue that they have limited administrative capacity and cannot afford to create participatory forums. "Both government will and public capacity are needed for effective PB. States may not have faith that the public can produce informed decisions as a result of lack of knowledge and expertise, and they may believe that PB will make their job more difficult in terms of managing public finances. Additionally, governments may believe that public consultations will only result in wish lists that do not necessarily reflect the realities of the national budget.97 Shan notes, "Governments may also worry that because participation cannot be made truly representative, important groups may be excluded, distorting policy."98 Finally, it is often assumed, and expectations are accordingly raised, that participatory budgeting will ensure that "spending and revenue generation can be made 'pro-poor,'"99 but this is not an automatic causal linkage. Other factors are at play. Notably, civil society actors may not have sufficient economic literacy to engage effectively other actors in the inevitable debates that arise over budgeting issues and priorities.
Participation in poverty reduction strategies (PRS) and economic policy making
Poverty reduction strategies (PRS) are a critical example of participation in economic decision making in need of problematization. PRS are vehicles of an anti-poverty framework announced in late 1999 by IFIs that aims to ensure broadly that economic and development policy reduces poverty. Two central issues were meant to distinguish PRS from their predecessor, structural adjustment programs: (1) the linkage of aid to "domestically developed, results-based poverty strategies," and (2) the value placed on process, as broad, participatory dialogue with representatives of civil society and the private sector is expected to result in tri-annual PRS. Go to Strategic frameworks: PRSPs
In literature on economic reform, participation is discussed as being "structured in" to existing processes of macroeconomic reform. Deborah Brautigam describes "stroke of the pen" reforms, such as devaluation of currencies and increased interest rates, where there is low scope for participation, although wage rates and price levels are often subject to negotiation. Restructuring reforms, including trade liberalization, financial sector deregulation, privatization, export promotion and public sector reform require feedback, information, consultation, and coalition building between government and interest groups in order to enhance their feasibility and political sustainability. Factors such as timing, the condition of the economy, and the position of the interest group (its legitimacy and level of coherence) can affect participation.100
Multiple studies have profoundly critiqued PRS for not producing intended results. A study commissioned by GTZ, for example, found that "most PRS processes to date have been founded essentially on participatory structures formed on an ad hoc basis. The institutionalization of participation is still in its infancy."101 The report questions the international communitys genuine commitment to participation in PRS: "In the majority of cases, the forms of participation established have involved consultations designed to allow an exchange of opinions and information between the government and non-governmental national actors. Collaboration has been less frequent, and joint decision-making on relevant aspects of pro-poor policy extremely rare."102
As demonstrated by the table above, joint decision making is the most participatory method, but it is rarely employed at the local level because governments believe that the public lacks the capacity and authority to make "binding" fiscal decisions. Similarly, donors may question the capacity of the state to make informed, long-term decisions for PRS.103 Additionally, "many African governments remain suspicious about the motives of civil society organizations and are reluctant to open up the political space for substantive dialogue to take place."104 Finally, governments may rush the development of PRSP to meet donor benchmarks, which limits the governments ability to consult the public. Critics cite this last issue, along with the lack of joint decision making, as proof that the international community is not truly committed to participatory processes.105
The World Bank has identified the following challenges in achieving full participation in the PRS process:
Despite the assumed potential advantages of a participatory process, scholar Fantu Cheru emphasizes that "genuine participation of local stakeholders is a challenge."108 The critical determining factor for broad-based consultation and joint decision making is the depth and scope of government commitment to a participatory process, but this, too, is often lacking.109 On the other hand, countries where the government allows citizen involvement in areas of governance, such as accountability of public funds and citizen monitoring of public services, have been able to build on the experience and conduct participatory processes effectively for PRSPs.110
Despite broad recognition that participation is critical to realizing goals of "nationally owned" strategies that are directly reflective of the public's needs, there is clear evidence that much more work is needed to ensure that participatory budgeting and PRS processes are truly participatory. Yet, while some may disagree, as Cheru states, "countrywide participation in PRSPs presents a paradigm shift from ineffective donor-led, conditionality-driven partnership"111 to a system that puts the recipient country in the driving seat.
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Challenge: Inadequate funding for post-conflict economic recoveryPost-conflict countries often face a severe lack of fiscal capacity to support "normal" government functions, much less provide funding for reconstruction and recovery. As highlighted by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), countries emerging from violent conflict often face extraordinary constraints in mobilizing the resources urgently required for relief, recovery, and economic reconstruction. While critically short of almost all expertise, newly established authorities must confront major challenges simultaneously, including: preserving the peace and safeguarding security; resettling internally displaced persons and reintegrating ex-combatants; rehabilitating essential infrastructure and key public institutions; reviving the public finance regime and asserting control over key national assets; generating employment opportunities and restoring private investors' confidence; and establishing mechanisms for transitional justice and the rule of law.112 Jump-starting the economy is greatly complicated by the fact that the state often has no revenue to pay for even such basic expenditures as salaries.113 Go to Activities: Sequencing
The New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) notes that the funding gap that has come to be well known in post-conflict settings is not in the absence of overall funding but rather in the types of funding available:114 "Current systems earmark funding for types of activities both broad ('humanitarian' or 'development') and specific ('schools in districts where or PRT is operational'). Their accessibility is a function of windows in MDTFs [multi-donor trust funds] and standing funds and the accountability and reporting requirements vary widely."115 Funding gaps exist in areas such as: capacity and coordinated strategic planning; political implementation; the development of realistic, flexible, and responsive strategies (i.e., context and conflict sensitivity); and the ability to spend development money early.116 Go to Public Finance
In addition, more funding is needed earlier in the recovery process. The importance of early funding for the building of key roads and of civil service, teacher, and health worker training facilities cannot be underestimated. According to Rahul Chandran and colleagues, "A strategy to prioritize and the capacity to execute must be matched with the size and scope of funding necessary-- essentially, to draw the development funding in, earlier."117 The CIC authors argue, "Perhaps the most critical funding flaw in early recovery is the inability to bring development funding forward and to adjust longer-term development spending to emerging and changing needs."118 Ultimately, these points illustrate the very interrelated nature of the gaps linked to strategy, capacity, and funding. Go to Models and Sequencing
Woodward has pointed out the need for attention to the following economic tasks for implementing peace agreements: funding to implement specific commitments in the peace agreement; building economic foundations to sustain peace in the long term; and sufficiently rapid economic revival to buy confidence in the peace process.119 Problematically, however, post-conflict states face extraordinary challenges in mobilizing domestic revenue to finance the peace. As detailed in the public finance and economic governance section, conflict severely impedes the ability of the state to mobilize revenues, as well as effectively to manage expenditures. A key aspect of this challenge is often a lack of confidence in the state, whereby the public is reluctant to pay taxes. As UNDP notes, "Without a revenue base, stimulating economic recovery through public expenditures becomes an impossible dream."120
Debate: Who pays for economic recovery?The question of who pays for economic recovery, and through what mechanisms, has heated up in recent years, as gaps and peacebuilding and humanitarian challenges and failures are identified. Some argue that the international community can provide technical support to ensure the sound public financial capacity of governments so that the governments can finance their own peace. James Boyce and Madalene O'Donnell of CIC describe four ways in which the international community can support government efforts to mobilize domestic revenue: by providing technical assistance, by linking some of its aid to progress in domestic revenue performance (i.e., conditionality), by helping to curb extralegal revenue extractions, and by reducing tax exemption on post-war aid.121
According to the CIC report on early recovery, the international community can implement several activities/systems for "closing the financing gap":122
As discussed in other sections of the portal, aid can, in effect, "crowd out" domestic capacities to pay for recovery and long-term development. Boyce and O'Donnell argue that too much aid can create unrealistic expectations and budget commitments, as well as weaken the government's resource mobilization capacity.129 Aid should have the ultimate goal of building institutions that effectively manage resources without donor assistance.130 It is particularly important that aid efforts avoid the tendency to create dual public sectors, one that is "funded and managed by the government" and another that is "funded and managed by the donors."131
Many suggest the better use of aid, rather than simply more aid. For Susan Woodward, "financing the peace" must go beyond return and reintegration issues toward ensuring a stable government is in place.132 Getting people back to work and transforming former warring factions into political parties capable of governing are key factors, while rebuilding vital physical infrastructure must accompany support for salaries so that people can actually get back to work,even though this goes against donor norms.133 Woodward notes that aid is overly influenced by operational, technical issues, often funded through non-governmental organizations. This creates an unequal power dynamic between donors and the receiving government. Ultimately, she argues, it is not that more aid is needed, but that aid must be better spent.134 For Boyce and O'Donnell, the focus needs to be on increasing the quality rather than the quantity of revenues.135 External resource caps can help with this. International aid can be better allocated if consideration is given to performance indicators.136
[Back to Top] 137 While this is increasingly recognized by international institutions involved in post-conflict peacebuilding and economic recovery efforts, it is a task that is often exceedingly difficult to implement in such settings, which have a multiplicity of competing demands and interests and a shortage of time, resources, and capacities.
Go to Definitions: Conflict sensitivity
As James Boyce and Madelene O'Donnell highlight in the case of public finance strategies, there are "key axes of differences in post war environments" that should inform action: the type of transition and resulting balance of power; the level of economic development; the scale of external assistance; the role of natural resource extraction and narcotics; the fault lines for conflict; the "neighborhood," or the characteristics of neighboring countries and/or regional considerations; the presence of an agreement on final status; and the history of relations with aid donors.138
Despite growing recognition of the importance of understanding the conflict context, few institutional mechanisms or practices are in place to shape economic recovery strategies in ways that fully recognize the country conflict context. For example, while the United Nations supports conflict-sensitive policies in theory, in practice the concept is more at the level of rhetoric and occasional ad hoc application.139 The problem is said to be not one of "analysis but rather action."140 In a review of Common Country Assessments (CCAs) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), one study found that the concept has not been institutionalized for the following reasons:141 Go to Strategic frameworks
1. Erin McCandless, "The Emergence of Peacebuilding Scholarship and Practice," and "Synopses of Major Concepts," in Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology, ed. Erin McCandless, Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E. King, and Ebrima Sall (Addis Ababa: University for Peace, 2007).
2. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).
3. Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective," in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and David Malone(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 91-111.
4. David Keen, Complex Emergencies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 25.
5. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001), 132.
6. Patrick Bond, "Global Uneven Development, Primitive Accumulation and Political-Economic Conflict in Africa: The Return of the Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 4, no. 2 (2008): 1-10.
7. Fukuda-Parr et al., "The Conflict-Development Nexus," 13.
9. UNDP, "Violent Conflict," 152-55.
10. Fukuda-Parr and Picciotto, "Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation in Africa," 3.
11. Robert Picciotto, "The Political Economy of Conflict," in Peace, Conflict and Development Reader, ed. Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo (Addis Ababa: University for Peace, 2009).
12. Fukuda-Parr et al., "The Conflict-Development Nexus," 11.
13. Kumar, Rebuilding Societies after Civil War, 30.
14. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 199-205.
15. DESA, Background Note for Expert Group Meeting, 2-3.
16. Carbonnier, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy, 7.
17. Fukuda-Parr and Picciotto, "Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation in Africa," 3-4.
18. UNDP, The Role of the UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations, 6.
19. See critiques of "market fundamentalism" by economists such as George Soros, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and William Easterly.
20. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jose Antonio Ocampo, Shari Spiegel, Ricardo French-Davis, and Deepak Nayyar, Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 221.
21. DESA, Background Note for Expert Group Meeting.
22. McCandless, Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings.
23. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 41.
24. Ibid., 40.
25. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992).
26. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 41.
27. Ibid., 29.
28. Fantu Cheru, "Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa: What Has Worked Well So Far? What Needs Changing?" Third World Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2006): 355.
29. Thandika Mkandawire, "Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation," Africa Development 30, no. 1/2 (200): 1.
30. Woodward, "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation," 191.
31. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 166.
32. Cheru, "Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa," 355.
33. Ibid., 355.
34. McCandless, "The Emergence of Peacebuilding Scholarship and Practice," 48. Scholars included Sachikonye (1995), Olukoshi (1993), and Onimode (1989).
35. Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, "A Dozen Reasons to Come to DC for April 16," Commondreams, April 5, 2000.
36. International Peace Academy (IPA), "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions" (report prepared by IPAs Africa Program for the Ford Foundation, September 2002), 16.
37. International Monetary Fund (IMF), The IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF): Is It Working? (Geneva: IMF, September 1999).
38. Kim, "Development," 131.
39. Ibid., 131.
40. Woodward, "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation," 191.
41. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 44.
42. Ibid., 46.
43. Ibid., 1-6.
44. Ibid., 7.
45. Ibid., 205-07.
46. Ibid., 199.
47. Ibid., 204.
48. Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?" 36.
49. Ibid., 37.
50. Boyce and ODonnell, "Peace and the Public Purse," 1.
51. Call, "Building State to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis," 1.
52. Ibid., 71.
53. Ibid., 12.
54. Paris and Sisk, Managing Contradictions, 9.; Call, "Building State to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis," 71.
55. Agni Kalfagianni, "Ethics and Politics on Human Development" (paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, California, March 26-29, 2008), 3.
56. Government of Liberia, "Liberia National Human Development Report 2006," 19.
57. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 1.
58. Kalfagianni, "Ethics and Politics on Human Development," 4.
59. Travis Parfitt, The End of Development? Modernity, Post-Modernity and Development (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 1.
60. Government of Liberia, "Liberia National Human Development Report 2006," 19.
61. Ibid., 19.
62. Ibid., 19.
63. Kalfagianni, "Ethics and Politics on Human Development," 1.
64. Center for Global Development, "Economic Growth."
65. Ul Haq, "The Human Development Paradigm," 17.
66. Fukuda-Parr et al., "The Conflict-Development Nexus."
67. Ul Haq, "The Human Development Paradigm," 18.
68. Fukuda-Parr et al., "The Conflict-Development Nexus."
69. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Rwanda,Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development: National Human Development Report (Kigali: UNDP Rwanda, 2007). See the introduction.
70. Kalfagianni, "Ethics and Politics on Human Development," 7.
71. Ul Haq, "The Human Development Paradigm," 17.
72. Government of Liberia, "Liberia National Human Development Report 2006," 19.
73. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Unleashing Human Creativity: National Strategies," in Human Development Report 2001 (New York: UNDP, 2001).
74. Kalfagianni, "Ethics and Politics on Human Development," 4-5.
75. Government of Liberia, "Liberia National Human Development Report 2006," 19.
76. Ul Haq, "The Human Development Paradigm," 19.
77. Government of Liberia, "Liberia National Human Development Report 2006," 19.
78. Ibid., 19.
79. Kim, "Development," 132.
80. Kalfagianni, "Ethics and Politics on Human Development," 8.
81. Ibid., 9.
82. Richard Posner, "The UN's Human Development Index: A Critique," Beckner-Posner Blog, posted on December 15, 2007.
83. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York: UNDP, 2002), 16.
84. Comment from Janvier Nkurunziza (2008).
85. Deborah Brautigam, "The People's Budget? Politics, Power, Popular Participation and Pro-Poor Economic Policy" (draft paper prepared for the Expert Group Meeting on Participation of Civil Society in Fiscal Policy, Division for Public Administration and Development Management, Socio-Economic Governance and Management Branch, United Nations, February 2, 2004), 4.
86. Ibid., 3.
87. Fukuda-Parr and McCandless, "An Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding," 212.
88. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, "Participatory Budgeting."
89. ParticipatoryBudgeting.org, "What is PB?"
90. Daniel Schugurensky, "Participatory Budget: A Tool for Democratizing Democracy" (talk given at the meeting
"Some Assembly Required: Participatory Budgeting in Canada and Abroad," Toronto, Canada, April 29, 2004).
92. Brian Wampler, "A Guide to Participatory Budgeting," NCDDs Learning Exchange (October 2005).
94. ParticipatoryBudgeting.org, "What is PB?"
95. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, "Participatory Budgeting."
96. Alejandro Bendana, "Alternative Financing for Development," Pambazuka, February 7, 2008.
97. Anwar Shah, Participatory Budgeting: Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 82.
98. Ibid., 82.
99. Brautigam, "The People's Budget," 2.
100. Deborah Brautigam, "Winners and Losers: The Politics of Participation in Economic Policy Reform" (paper prepared for the USAID Conference on Economic Growth and Democratic Governance, Washington, DC, October 1997).
101. Walter Eberlei, "Institutionalised Participation in Processes Beyond the PRSP" (study commissioned by GTZ, September 2001), 3.
102. Ibid., 3.
103. Ibid., 3.
104. Cheru, "Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa," 365.
105. Ibid., 365.
106. World Bank, Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Retrospective Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, January 2002).
107. Brautigam, "The People's Budget," 4.
108. Cheru, "Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa," 364.
109. Ibid., 364.
110. Ibid., 364-65.
111. Ibid., 364.
112. Ohiorhenuan and Kumar, Sustaining Post-conflict Economic Recovery, 3.
113. Ibid., 4.
114. CIC, Recovering from War, 26.
115. Ibid., 41.
116. Ibid., 26.
117. Ibid., 41.
118. Ibid., 41.
119. Woodward, "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation."
120. Ohiorhenuan and Kumar, "Sustaining Post-conflict Economic Recovery," 4.
121. Boyce and ODonnell, "Peace and the Public Purse," 276.
122. CIC, "Recovering from War," 9.
123. Ibid., 9.
124. Ibid., 9.
125. Ibid., 9.
126. Ibid., 10.
127. Jonathan Goodhand, Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 84.
129. Boyce and ODonnell, "Peace and the Public Purse."
132. Woodward, "Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation."
135. Boyce and ODonnell, "Peace and the Public Purse."
137. Fukuda-Parr and McCandless, "An Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding," 194.
138. Boyce and ODonnell, "Peace and the Public Purse," 2-4.
139. United Nations Development Group (UNDG), Lessons Learned Workshop: Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into UN Planning and Programming (New York: UNDG, 2005).
140. Marc-Andre Franche, Conflict Prevention NHDR Thematic Guidance Note (New York: United Nations Development Programme, August 2004), 9.
141. Michi Ebata, Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Analysis and Programming: A Review of CCA/UNDAF Processes (New York: United Nations Development Programme, October 2001), 10.
142. McCandless, Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings.