Case Studies

Last Updated: April 13, 2009

 

•   Afghanistan: Limited reconstruction of the justice system and public insecurity
•   Bosnia and Herzegovina: Judicial personnel reforms and the choice of a general reappointment strategy
•   El Salvador: Judicial independence, pluralization versus depoliticization
•   Kosovo: Local ownership versus impartial and capable justice
•   Timor-Leste: Building a judiciary capacity from scratch




Afghanistan: Limited reconstruction of the justice system and public insecurity


Judicial reconstruction

The post-Taliban Afghan justice sector was "in a shambles after 23 years of war."¹ The case of Afghanistan vividly illustrates that, given the devastating effect of protracted violent conflict, the post-war challenge is one of judicial reconstruction rather than reform. In that country, the challenges stem from both the domestic political situation and the approach of international actors. 

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 (the agreement for the transitional period of governance in post-Taliban Afghanistan) established the Judicial Reform Commission (JRC), which was mandated to "rebuild the domestic justice system."² At a December 2002 summit on the justice sector, donors committed $30 million to the justice sector. JRC came up with a master plan that included 30 projects over an 18-month period. This promising start stalled for a variety of reasons.   

In theory, JRC was intended to guide the judicial reform process, although its role was limited to proposing reforms and coordinating donor assistance. In reality, however, this did not happen. JRC was given an ambitious mandate, but it lacked the resources and political support to carry it out. The absence of cooperation among the formal institutions of justice--the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the attorney generals office--was a major obstacle. According to one close participant, there was "deep enmity between the Afghan institutions" because of political fractiousness and turf wars.

Most judicial reconstruction activities consisted of training judges and prosecutors, constructing or rehabilitating court facilities, and drafting new laws and revising existing ones. In short, judicial reform has been technical in nature. According to the Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, "This progress is patchy and very modest, and building on it faces serious obstacles."³ According to one knowledgeable practitioner, international aid to the justice system has been "largely dysfunctional," consisting of "providing band-aids to a thoroughly destroyed system."⁴

The Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 paints a sobering picture of the current justice system. A survey of 157 randomly selected Afghan judges found that 44 percent had received a university degree from a sharia (Islamic law) faculty and that only 11.6 percent had received a degree from a law faculty. One-fifth of judges had no higher-level education. The survey also found that 56.7 percent of judges had completed the required one-year judicial training, 10.1 percent had participated in other judicial training programs, and 14.3 percent had received training after judicial appointment. Access to legal resources is another major challenge, as 82.8 percent of judges do not have access to Supreme Court written documents, only 63.7 percent have access to statutes and government regulations, and 54.8 percent have no access to legal textbooks or procedural codes. In terms of infrastructure, the report notes that 97.8 percent of courthouses are in need of construction or rehabilitation.⁵

The average salary of a prosecutor is $60 per month and that of a judge is $100, which accounts for the pervasiveness of corruption in the justice system.⁶ The judiciary is perceived as the most corrupt institution in Afghanistan.⁷ Moreover, the lack of public security, the ongoing violence (the Taliban insurgency), and the limited reach of the central government make it extremely difficult for judges to operate independently and impartially. Judges regularly face threats and intimidation. This was starkly illustrated by the kidnapping and murder of four Afghan judges in Ghazni Province in August 2007.⁸ 



International "light footprint" approach

The justice sector was not a priority for key international actors, especially the United States and the United Nations (UN). The UN approach in Afghanistan differed drastically from its previous involvement in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. In Afghanistan, the UN adopted a "light footprint," or a minimalist approach, in part in response to some of the perceived failures of the UN missions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo. In the words of a practitioner, "Ironically, this was an example of not listening to the locals enough who knew that a very heavy footprint was needed."⁹ 

The United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) played an advisory role to the Afghan government but had no implementation functions. The rationale behind this was to encourage an Afghan-led reconstruction process, as well as to encourage donor countries to play a more active assistance role. As part of this approach, donor countries would take on the responsibility of a "lead nation" in a particular sector. As such, Italy became the "lead nation" in the justice sector and was responsible for much of the funding and coordination for the sector. Tension and lack of cooperation emerged between Italy and JRC. JRC was disbanded in 2005.  

The Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan, held in July 2007, highlighted the need for an Afghan-led justice sector strategy, and donors pledged about $360 million over a five-year period to the justice sector.¹⁰ It remains to be seen whether the apparently greater attention to judicial reform will produce concrete and sustainable results.

Lessons from Afghanistan?

The case of Afghanistan clearly shows that judicial reconstruction is a daunting challenge, especially under unfavorable conditions (e.g., widespread insecurity, political fragmentation, lack of political will, and lack of human capital and resources). It also shows that judicial reconstruction is not a panacea; it cannot be achieved unless other pillars of peacebuilding (such as security, economic reconstruction, and so on) are achieved in a synergistic manner. Also, a key shortcoming in Afghanistan was the failure of the various actors to address gender issues. Finally, the case of Afghanistan calls into question the viability of the "lead nation" approach to sectoral assistance to post-conflict countries, which warrants careful review before being applied in the future.     

For more information:

Amnesty International. Afghanistan: Re-establishing the Rule of Law. New York: Amnesty International, August 2003.

Barker, Kim. "At the Supreme Court, an Unlikely New Hero." Chicago Tribune, January 21, 2007.

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice. Justice for All: A Comprehensive Needs Analysis for Justice in Afghanistan. Kabul: Ministry of Justice, May 2005.

International Crisis Group (ICG). Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice. Brussels: ICG, January 2003.

Miller, Laurel, and Robert Perito. "Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan." United States Institute of Peace Special Report 114, March 2004.

The Afghanistan Compact. Adopted at "Building on Success: The London Conference on Afghanistan," London, United Kingdom, January 31-February 1, 2006.

Their, Alexander J. "Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan." Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Working Paper No. 19, 1 November 2004.

"Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implication for International Peace and Security." UN Doc. A/62/345-S/2007/555, 21 September 2007.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradition: The Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. Geneva: UNDP, 2007.

Wafa, Abdul Waheed. "Bodies of 4 Kidnapped Afghan Judges Are Found." New York Times, August 2, 2007.

Websites

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)

Center for Policy and Human Development, Kabul University

Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (Rome, Italy, July 2-3, 2007)

Ministry of Justice of Afghanistan

Supreme Court of Afghanistan

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)



Bosnia and Herzegovina: Judicial personnel reforms and the choice of a "general reappointment" strategy



In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), no comprehensive effort at judicial reform was made in the first few years after the Dayton Peace Accords (1995). In 2000, the Office of the High Commissioner (OHR), under the aegis of the International Judicial Commission (IJC), which was mandated to oversee judicial reform in BiH, mandated a "comprehensive peer review," whereby entity-level commissions and councils of sitting judges and prosecutors would vet their colleagues. The purpose of the review process was to improve the quality of the judiciary by weeding out unqualified judges and prosecutors. Prior to the judicial reform process, judicial review and disciplinary action were virtually unknown.¹¹ The peer review process lasted 18 months, during which judicial commissions and councils reviewed 1,145 judges and processed about 1,594 citizen complaints. The results of the review process were disappointing. Only five officeholders were removed and 32 disciplinary procedures initiated, and 30 individuals resigned. In sum, the review process resulted in less than a 2.5 percent rate of replacement.¹²

According to the official IJC report, the failure of the "comprehensive peer review" model was "due primarily to the reluctance of local judges and prosecutors to act against their colleagues."¹³ As an International Crisis Group report put it, "In the Bosnian context of a highly politicized, war-inflated, post-socialist, nationally partisan, financially dependent, and institutionally deficient judiciary, peer review is a contradiction in terms."¹⁴ This led to the adoption of a "more aggressive and intrusive reform process."¹⁵

Essentially acknowledging the failure of the peer review approach, OHR in 2002 embarked on a new approach to vetting judicial personnel, known as "general reappointment." All judicial posts became open, and incumbent judges and prosecutors had to compete for their jobs against other applicants.¹⁶

To undertake the reappointment, OHR established three independent High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (two entity-level councils and one state-level council).¹⁷ In the reappointment process, there were 2,000 applicants for 953 posts. Of the posts, 878 were filled by May 2004. Importantly, 30 percent of incumbent judges and prosecutors were not reappointed, and 18 percent of applicants were non-incumbents.¹⁸

The reappointment strategy was not solely aimed at improving the quality of judicial personnel. It also served "as a tool to restructure the court system, reducing its size and ensuring proportionate ethnic representation."¹⁹ The judicial system in BiH was considered too bloated, inefficient, and costly. The restructuring of the court system resulted in a more reduced judicial system. For example, the number of judges was reduced by 30 percent (and more than 30 percent of first-instance courts were closed down).²⁰ Moreover, "the ethnic composition of the [judicial] system significantly improved as a result of the reappointment process."²¹

The "general reappointment" strategy has been successfully carried out in Brcko District, which was under international administration.²² In that district, the process of judicial reform lasted two years and was implemented by one agency, the Brcko Law Revision Commission (BLRC).²³ BLRC was under the direct supervision of the district supervisor. In an effort to set up an independent judiciary, a "general reappointment" model was adopted. According to the International Crisis Group report, the application of this model resulted in the replacement of 80 percent of judges and prosecutors. The new cohort consisted of 21 judges, seven prosecutors, and six lawyers. The new judges and prosecutors were appointed for a one-year probationary period, followed by a performance review for long-term tenure.²⁴ It is widely believed that Brcko's relatively smooth experience with judicial reform was due to its specific status and the high involvement of international judges and prosecutors. As one Brcko District judge observed, "If the internationals were not involved during and after the judicial reform to assure the integrity of the process and fend off attacks after the reform, there would have been an open run at the judiciary."²⁵ Success was also due to the open and objective criteria and procedures used during the reappointment process, in contrast to what happened with the police vetting in BiH.²⁶

In post-conflict situations, a "general reappointment" strategy may have the potential to foster a more merit-based judicial system. It is certainly not feasible in every post-conflict context, however, as it implies either substantial domestic will to reform or extensive international involvement (something that was criticized by many in BiH as an imposition).

For more information:

Documents

International Crisis Group (ICG). Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Brussels: ICG, March 2002.

Doyle, Michael H. "Too Little, Too Late? Justice and Security Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In Constructing Justice and Security after War, edited by Charles T. Call, 271-311. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Mayer-Rieckh, Alexander.  "Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutor's Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, edited by Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, 180-220. New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007.  


Websites

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)


El Salvador: Judicial independence, pluralization versus depoliticization

For many, El Salvador represents a "success story" of conflict resolution and post-war peacebuilding. In 1992, the government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FLMN) signed a United Nations-brokered peace accord that put to an end 12 years of civil war. At the time, the international community saw El Salvador as a crucial "test case" for peacebuilding because it had a lot going for it, specifically a negotiated agreement and enormous international involvement (especially from the United Nations and the United States). El Salvador was the third-highest recipient of United States rule of law assistance between 1993 and 1998, receiving $41 million ($27.9 million of which went to criminal justice and law enforcement).²⁷

The experience of El Salvador illustrates the complexities of judicial reform, even under apparently favorable conditions. According to Margaret Popkin, "An independent, efficient, accessible, and impartial justice system had never existed in El Salvador. A profound transformation was called for, not simply the correction of certain aspects of the system."²⁸ Yet, the detailed peace accords paid limited attention to judicial reform, although they did articulate important reforms, such as a two-thirds majority for the election of Supreme Court judges and the attorney general, greater independence of the National Judiciary Council, and an increased budget for the judiciary (6 percent of the government budget). As a consequence, "no blueprint for reform of the judiciary emerged."²⁹

The main impetus for judicial reform came from the wholly international United Nations Truth Commission, whose report offered a series of recommendations on reforming the justice sector (more than half of the report's recommendations dealt with the justice system).³⁰ The report provided a comprehensive indictment of the justice system and recommended far-reaching reforms, such as the removal of the whole sitting Supreme Court, the curtailment of the Supreme Court's powers, and the independence of the National Judiciary Council. The key issue for the international community was to ensure the independence (both internal and external) of the judiciary system. The Salvadoran justice system was highly centralized and vertical, with the Supreme Court being in charge of the judicial branch. As a result, there was no internal independence within the justice system. Moreover, the Supreme Court was dominated by one party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), which opposed and obstructed the judicial reform process. The Supreme Court president responded to the Truth Commissions report by saying that "only God" had the authority to remove him from office.³¹

Important reforms started to be implemented. An entirely new, and political diverse and more professional, Supreme Court was elected in 1994. The new Supreme Court judges were elected to staggered nine-year terms, as opposed to the previous four-year terms, which coincided with electoral cycles. Adding to this, the National Judicial Council was made responsible for nominating and evaluating judges and for running the Judicial Training School. There were also reforms in criminal justice, with new codes that took effect in 1998. Despite these reforms, the judiciary was far from transformed. Very important, the Supreme Court still retained the power to appoint, discipline, and remove judges.

It is still unclear whether the justice system has become more shielded from external political influences. As one scholar notes, "Justice reforms could be said to have pluralized the courts more than depoliticized them."³² Most worryingly, the justice system continued to suffer from low public confidence in the post-war years, largely because of skyrocketing crime rates. According to a 2001 poll, for example, 48 percent expressed low confidence in the justice system--a higher percentage than 10 years earlier.³³ In sum, "Ten years after the peace accords, the judicial system remained weak, inefficient, antiquated, overly partisan, and subject to corruption."³⁴    

Paradoxically, the Salvadoran case illustrates both the possibility of rapid change (when there is a political window of opportunity) and the elusive quest for sustainable reform. The chief problem with the way judicial reforms were undertaken was "a lack of Salvadoran ownership of the process and the top-down approach."³⁵ According to Popkin, the main lesson from El Salvador is that "international donors can provide crucial assistance, but they cannot and should not replace societal processes. The enormous international involvement in El Salvador was not matched by a corresponding role for civil society in setting an overall agenda for reform, defining priorities, or choosing the measures that would be undertaken."³⁶ Popkin concludes that "if anything is clear from the Salvadoran experience, it is that changing entrenched attitudes and practices is far more difficult than outside actors tend to appreciate."³⁷

For more information:

Documents

Call, Charles T. "The Mugging of a Success Story: Justice and Security Reform in El Salvador." In Constructing Justice and Security after War, edited by Charles T. Call.Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Call, Charles T. "Democratization, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador." Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 4 (2003): 827-62.

Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. San Salvador: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993.

Popkin, Margaret. Peace without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

Popkin, Margaret. "Building the Rule of Law in Post-War El Salvador." In El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, edited by Margarita S. Studemeister. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001.

Websites

Instituto de Derechos Humanos, Universidad Centroamericana Jose José Simeón Cañas (IDHUCA)


Kosovo: Local ownership versus impartial and capable justice

In Kosovo, the judicial system had totally collapsed when the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) arrived in 1999.³⁸ Yet, for political reasons, judicial responsibilities were not included in UNMIK's mandate. Whereas security, for instance, was entirely ensured by international actors through the deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo force (KFOR) and UNMIK international civilian police, local Kosovan judges and prosecutors retained exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of justice.³⁹

Throughout 1999 and 2000, the special representative of the United Nations secretary-general (SRSG) appointed several hundred local judges and prosecutors. The overwhelming majority of them were ethnic Albanians, in part because there were no Serbs left or willing to serve in the new administration.⁴⁰ Evidence of ethnic bias in the administration of justice soon emerged. ⁴¹ The Kosovan Albanian-run justice system essentially discriminated against ethnic Serbs and displayed favoritism toward ethnic Albanians.⁴² Many suspects were released before any investigation could take place. Many felt that the reasons for the actions of the Albanian Kosovan jurists included actual bias, community pressure and fear of ostracism, and threats or fear of harm against self or family.⁴³ KFOR then instituted "COMKFOR," a practice whereby suspects continued to be detained despite release orders from judges. This presented a serious human rights dilemma.⁴⁴

In response to the ethnically biased nature of the judicial system, the SRSG began appointing international judges and prosecutors to Kosovos district courts and Supreme Court. Initially, the international officials were outnumbered and thus outvoted by local officials on judicial panels. This meant that the problem of ethnic bias persisted. The SRSG eventually enacted UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, which established so-called "64" panels--judge panels with a majority of international judges. 

The dilemma in Kosovo between local ownership and a fair justice system is still unresolved. While Kosovan judges and prosecutors handle most criminal and civil cases, international judges and prosecutors handle cases of ethnic violence and organized crime.⁴⁵ Most problematically, in the past there was little strategic interaction between international and local professionals with the ultimate aim of transferring necessary skills, although the situation has gradually improved.⁴⁶

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. This has led to the gradual phasing out of UNMIK, which will be replaced by a European Union (EU) mission. But, crucially, the EU mission will not take over governance responsibilities; rather, it will advise and support the Kosovo state institutions. As part of the new EU mission, a European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was established in February 2008. It will consist of more than 2,000 European judges, prosecutors, police, and customs officers, representing the largest EU field operation ever. European judges and prosecutors will be collated with their Kosovan colleagues on mixed panels dealing with sensitive issues, thereby perpetuating part of the dilemma of local ownership versus impartial justice. 

For more information:

Documents

Chesterman, Simon. Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan. New York: International Peace Academy, September 2002.

Hartmann, Michael E. "International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Postconflict Peacekeeping." United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 112, October 2003.

International Crisis Group (ICG). Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo.  Brussels: ICG, September 2002.

Rausch, Collette. "From Elation to Disappointment: Justice and Security Reform in Kosovo." In Constructing Justice and Security After War, edited by Charles T. Call, 271-311. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Strohmeyer, Hansjorg. "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor." American Journal of International Law 95 (2001): 46-63.

Websites

European Union Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo)

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)



Timor-Leste: Building a judiciary capacity from scratch



In October 1999, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), whose mandate included the establishment of a national judiciary.⁴⁷ Timor-Leste was a case of an extremely low post-conflict starting point for judicial reform. More specifically, the virtual absence of judicial capacity was a pressing challenge and the system needed to be built from scratch. According to one source, "Fewer than ten lawyers were estimated to have remained, and these were believed to be so inexperienced as to be unequal to the task of serving in a new Timorese justice system."⁴⁸

Despite such inauspicious initial conditions, UNTAET was keen on "timorizing" the judicial branch, for political (symbolic, building permanent institutions) and pragmatic reasons (translation, sustainability).⁴⁹ UNTAET Regulation 1999/3 established a Transitional Judicial Services Commission consisting of three Timorese and two international members tasked with recommending judicial candidates to the special representative of the United Nations secretary-general (SRSG). Judicial recruitment was done by dropping leaflets from Interantional Force for East Timor (INTERFET) planes.⁵⁰ Within two months, 60 qualified Timorese applicants had applied, of whom eight judges and two prosecutors were sworn in on January 7, 2000. They were appointed for a two-year period. None of the appointees had previously served as a judge or a prosecutor.⁵¹

Training and mentoring local judicial staff

UNTAET devised a three-stage training program for the provisional judicial personnel. The first stage consisted of a one-week mandatory quick-impact training prior to taking office. The second stage consisted of mandatory ongoing training while in office. The third stage consisted of a "mentoring scheme," in which international legal practitioners would serve as "shadow" judges, prosecutors, and public defenders without actually exercising judicial power.⁵² A number of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders went to Portugal for two-month training courses as part of an entirely separate program.⁵³

According to one comprehensive assessment of UNTAET, "The training and mentoring given to these inexperienced personnel were not well conceived."⁵⁴ The mentoring component of the training program was particularly unsuccessful because UNTAET had difficulties recruiting experienced international legal practitioners. Moreover, each training module included all judicial personnel (including judges and prosecutors). As a result, the functioning of courts was paralyzed. What is more, "the much-needed training and mentoring were made all the more difficult as the judges were already operating in their new professional roles, with all the attendant pressures and expectations that go with them." According to the Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), a Timorese non-governmental organization, "From 2000 to September 2004, international assistance to the Courts of Timor Leste was limited to small scale mentoring and some ad hoc training for judges, prosecutors and court clerks. Timorese court actors were therefore recruited and worked in their positions for three years without any significant international assistance to strengthen and develop their skills. These are amongst the main factors that contributed to the problems currently found within the Timor Leste judicial system."⁵⁵ As it turned out, all 22 Timorese judges failed their probationary evaluations in January 2005.⁵⁶

A more systematic approach to judicial training was soon adopted. In 2004, a Legal Training Centre (LTC) was established, and it began administering a professional training program for all judicial personnel. The training at LTC is funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and conducted by international judges and prosecutors working in the Timorese court system. The judicial training program consists of three phases: (1) a one-year theoretical stage, (2) a six-month practice stage, and (3) one-year probationary employment.⁵⁷ The LTC library is also a vital resource for law students at the National University of Timor-Leste.

The most significant achievement to date with respect to judicial training has been the appointment of 27 national judicial personnel in June 2007 (judges, prosecutors, and public defenders), after a two-and-a-half-year training and probationary period.⁵⁸ A second group of 12 judicial personnel graduated at the end of 2007.⁵⁹ A 2006 JMSP survey found that probationary judicial personnel were mostly satisfied with the training program, although they considered language to be "the greatest problem of the training program" (virtually all instruction is conducted in Portuguese, and many judicial personnel lack a strong command of Portuguese).⁶⁰

Gradual building of local ownership

It is important to note that, despite the initial emphasis on Timorese judicial personnel, international judges, prosecutors, and court clerks were gradually brought in to ensure the basic functioning of the judicial system, especially in district courts. Given the fact that the entire Timorese judicial corps was enrolled in the training program, international judicial personnel played a vital role in temporarily filling the void in indigenous judicial capacity.⁶¹ Yet, the UNDP mid-term evaluation report noted that "an ongoing heavy presence of international actors could hinder the development of national ownership and leadership within the justice system."⁶² This is the difficult balance to achieve, as without the internationals the system would not have functioned at all. How best to insure a transition and how gradual it should be are difficult questions when the entire judiciary capacity needs to be built from scratch.⁶³

The sustainability of the judicial training program is still a cause for concern. As noted in the UNDP mid-term evaluation report, "The gravest concern of the evaluation team was that planning for new intakes of trainees has not yet commenced."⁶⁴ Another ongoing challenge is that the LTC is currently run entirely by international legal practitioners. A "training-the-trainers" program has yet to be established so as to provide Timorese actors with the skills with which to run the LTC.

The self-sufficiency of the judicial system at large also remains an open question. As pointed out by a recent United Nations secretary-general report, the national judicial capacities "are still insufficient to meet the country's needs."⁶⁵

The Timor-Leste case seems to echo the prevailing "lessons learned" leitmotif in post-conflict judicial reform and reconstruction programs: ad hoc, intermittent programs are ineffectual, while sustained, systematic, and integrated approaches to reconstruction and reform yield more sustainable results.

For more information:

Documents

Babo-Soares, Dionision. "Law and Order: Judiciary Development in East Timor." Paper prepared for the conference, "Comparing Experiences with Post-Conflict State Building in Asia and Europe," Denpasar, Bali-Indonesia, October 15-17, 2001.

Chesterman, Simon. Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan. New York: International Peace Academy, September 2002.

Conflict Security and Development Group. A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change: East Timor. London: Kings College, London, March 2003.

Strohmeyer, Hansjorg. "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor." American Journal of International Law 95 (2001): 46-63.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP Strengthening the Justice System Programme in Timor-Leste: Independent/External Mid-term Evaluation Report. Geneva: UNDP, September 2007.

West, Ronald A. "Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Justice and Security Reform in East Timor." In Constructing Justice and Security After War, edited by Charles T. Call, 313-50. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Websites

East Timor Law Journal

Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)

United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste

United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)



1. International Crisis Group (ICG), Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice (Brussels: ICG, January 2003), 1.
2. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice (Geneva: UNDP, 2007), 80-81.
3. Ibid., 82.
4. J. Alexander Their, "Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan," Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Working Paper No. 19 (1 November 2004), 14.
5. UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, 70-71.
6. "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implication for International Peace and Security," UN Doc. A/62/345-S/2007/555 (21 September 2007), 9, para. 37.
7. UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, 72.
8. Abdul Waheed Wafa, "Bodies of 4 Kidnapped Afghan Judges Are Found," New York Times, August 2, 2007.
9. Comment by Bill O'Neill (June 2, 2008).
10. "Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Chairs Conclusions" (Conclusions drawn from the Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Rome, Italy, July 2-3, 2007).
11. Independent Judicial Commission, Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission, January 2001-March 2004 (Sarajevo: Independent Judicial Commission, November 2004), 35.
12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Brussels: ICG, March 2002), 36.
13. Independent Judicial Commission, Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission, vii.
14. ICG, Courting Disaster,7.
15. Ibid.
16. Michael H. Doyle, "Too Little, Too Late? Justice and Security Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in Constructing Justice and Security after War, ed. Charles T. Call (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 251.
17. Ibid., 196-97.
18. Ibid., 201.
19. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, "Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutors Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, ed. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007), 196.
20. Ibid., 197-98.
21. Ibid., 197­-98.
22. Brcko District was formed of the entire territory of the former Brcko municipality, of which 48 percent (including Brcko City) was in Republika Srpska, while 52 percent was in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The status of Brcko was submitted to an arbitration, according to Annex 2, Article V, of the Dayton Agreements. The arbitration agreement was finalized in April 1996, resulting in a "district" that was to be administrated by international representation with ambassador status. In 2006, under the supervisory order, all "Entity legislation in Brcko District and the Entity Border Line" were abolished. The ruling made by Brcko Supervisor Susan Johnson abolished all entity laws in the district and abolished the entity border line. The ruling made the laws of the district and the laws of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (including the laws of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) paramount within the district.
23. ICG, Courting Disaster, 49.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 54.
26. Comment by Bill O'Neill (June 2, 2008).
27.Margaret Popkin, Peace without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 244.
28. Popkin, Peace Without Justice, 97.
29. Ibid., 5.
30.Margaret Popkin, "Building the Rule of Law in Post-War El Salvador," In El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, ed. Margarita S. Studemeister (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 11.
31. Charles T.  Call, "El Salvador: The Mugging of a Success Story," in Constructing Justice and Security after War, ed. Charles T. Call (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 50.
32. Ibid., 52.
33. Ibid., 57.
34. Ibid., 57.
35. Ibid., 251.
36. Popkin, Peace Without Justice, 244.
37. Ibid., 251.
38. Strohmeyer, "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System," 50.
39. Michael E. Hartmann, "International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post-Conflict Peacekeeping," United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 112 (October 2003), 1.
40. Comment by Bill O'Neill (June 2, 2008).
41. Colette Rausch, From Elation to Disappointment: Justice and Security Reform in Kosovo, in Constructing Justice and Security after War, ed. Charles T. Call (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press), 280.
42. Hartmann, "International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo."
43. Ibid., 6.
44. Comment by Bill O'Neill (June 2, 2008).
45. Rausch, "From Elation to Disappointment," 302.
46. Rausch, Combating Serious Crimes in Post-Conflict Societies, 87.
47. Ronald A. West, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Justice and Security Reform in East Timor," in Constructing Justice and Security after War, ed. Charles T. Call (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 317-18.
48. Strohmeyer, "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System," 50.
49. Simon Chesterman, Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan (New York: International Peace Academy), 6-7.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Strohmeyer, "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System," 56.
53. Conflict Security and Development Group, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change: East Timor (London: Kings College, London, March 2003), para. 233.
54. Ibid., executive summary, para. x.
55. Judicial System Monitoring Programme(JSMP), Overview of Timor Leste Justice Sector (Dili: JSMP, March 2005), 12.
56. Ibid.
57. Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), New Players in Timor-Leste's Justice System(Dili: JSMP, August 2006), 2.
58. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNDP Strengthening the Justice System Programme in Timor-Leste: Independent/External Mid-term Evaluation Report (Geneva: UNDP, September 2007), 43, para. 4.3.2.
59. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste" (for the period from 21 August 2007 to 7 January 2008), UN Doc. S/2008/26 (July 29, 2008), 12, para. 37.
60. JSMP, New Players in Timor-Leste's Justice System, 3.
61. JSMP, Overview of Timor Leste Justice Sector, 12.
62. UNDP, Strengthening the Justice System Programme in Timor-Leste, 27, para. 4.1.38.
63. Comment by Bill O'Neill (June 2, 2008).
64. Ibid., 46, para. 4.3.24.
65. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste," 19, para. 59.